Mekelle has changed hands again. For Eritrea, however, the greater concern is not whether the fighting in Tigray accidentally crosses the border. The more serious question has been developing in plain sight for nearly three years: Ethiopia has elevated sovereign access to the Red Sea into a national objective, and Eritrea’s coastline, particularly Assab, has repeatedly entered the discussion surrounding that ambition. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reinforced the importance of the issue again on October 5, telling parliament that Ethiopia cannot complete its modernization without access to the sea and promising to pursue an outlet through negotiation and what he called “give and take.” Ethiopia says it wants a peaceful solution, and there is no publicly verified evidence that Addis Ababa has issued an operational order to invade Eritrea. But Eritrea would be equally foolish to ignore the direction of the rhetoric. There is an important difference between asking a neighbor for commercial access to its ports and speaking of sovereign access to a coastline that belongs to another country. One is a legitimate subject for negotiation. The other raises a question of territory, sovereignty and borders. (apnews.com)
That distinction has become even more important following the latest statements by Abraham Belay, Ethiopia’s former defense minister and former head of the interim administration in Tigray. Belay accused Eritrea of involvement in the renewed fighting and warned that Ethiopia’s response would be “doubled” if what he described as Eritrean intervention continued. Eritrea denies involvement, and the allegation has not been independently established. That must be stated clearly. But Belay’s warning cannot simply be brushed aside either. He is not an anonymous commentator speaking from the margins of Ethiopian politics. He has occupied some of the country’s most important security and political positions. When a figure with that background publicly threatens an escalated response against Eritrea at a time when relations have collapsed and sovereign access to the sea has become a major Ethiopian political objective, Eritreans have every reason to pay attention. His words do not prove that an invasion order has already been issued, but they add another troubling piece to a pattern that Asmara has been warning about for some time. (addisstandard.com)
This is why the current war in Tigray matters to Eritrea in a different way than it did only a few weeks ago. Federal and allied forces have regained Mekelle after the TPLF withdrew, giving Addis Ababa an important battlefield victory. That does not mean the war is over. The previous conflict should have taught everyone in the region how quickly control of cities can change and how misleading declarations of final victory can become. Nor does losing Mekelle necessarily mean that the TPLF has lost its ability to continue fighting. What matters from an Eritrean perspective is what the conflict does to Ethiopia’s wider strategic calculations. If Addis Ababa consolidates its position in Tigray, does that reduce regional tensions by allowing the government to concentrate on reconstruction and political settlement, or does greater confidence eventually allow it to turn more attention toward the Red Sea? If the war continues, does Ethiopia remain consumed by an internal conflict, or could Eritrea increasingly be blamed for Ethiopian battlefield difficulties? These are questions, not predictions, but recent accusations against Asmara make them impossible to ignore.
The danger becomes clearer when we separate what is known from what is alleged. Ethiopia has closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled 10 Eritrean diplomats. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic relations. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting the forces fighting the federal government, and all three governments have denied those accusations. Ethiopian officials have also alleged that Eritrean forces entered Ethiopia through Afar. That claim has not been independently verified. Eritrea, for its part, has accused Addis Ababa of training and supporting Eritrean armed opposition groups and has described Ethiopia’s campaign for sovereign sea access as part of a wider threat to Eritrean territorial integrity. Those allegations also require independent evidence. The collapse in relations, however, is not an allegation. Neither is Ethiopia’s public campaign for access to the Red Sea. Those are established developments, and together they have created an atmosphere in which an accusation that might once have produced a diplomatic exchange can now become the language used to justify military retaliation.
This is precisely why Eritrea should keep returning the argument to first principles. Ethiopia is landlocked. It has more than 100 million people, a large economy and understandable reasons for wanting reliable, affordable access to global shipping. None of that is controversial. Eritrea could itself benefit enormously from a future in which Ethiopian goods move through Eritrean ports under peaceful, commercially negotiated arrangements. Assab does not become less Eritrean because Ethiopian trucks use it. If relations between the two countries were stable, commercial transit could create jobs, infrastructure and revenue on both sides of the border. The problem begins when access is transformed into sovereignty. A commercial arrangement gives Ethiopia the ability to move goods through a port. Sovereignty gives Ethiopia political authority over territory. They are not different versions of the same thing. They are fundamentally different concepts.
International law recognizes that distinction. Landlocked countries have rights of access to and from the sea, but those rights are exercised through arrangements agreed with transit states. Landlocked status does not create ownership of another country’s coastline. The United Nations Charter is equally clear that states may not threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Ethiopia therefore has every right to negotiate for better port access. It can seek transit agreements with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya or other partners willing to negotiate. What it cannot legitimately claim is that being landlocked creates a right to Eritrean sovereign territory. Geography can create an economic problem. It does not erase an international border.
This is also why the October 4 meeting in New El Alamein deserves attention without exaggeration. Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia issued a declaration emphasizing sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference and peaceful resolution of disputes. The four countries also stated that governance of the Red Sea should remain the responsibility of littoral states. Given Ethiopia’s maritime campaign and the deteriorating relationships surrounding it, the significance of that language is difficult to miss. At the same time, there is no need to invent more than the declaration actually says. It did not establish a military alliance against Ethiopia, nor did the four governments announce a collective war plan. It did something more defensible: it placed sovereignty and recognized borders at the center of their regional position. For Eritrea, that is where the argument should remain.
Eritrea should also resist allowing Ethiopia to become the organizing principle of all its regional relationships. Cooperation with Egypt should serve Eritrean interests, not merely Egyptian disagreements with Ethiopia. Relations with Sudan and Somalia should be built around security, commerce and regional stability. The same applies to Eritrea’s slowly changing relationship with Washington. The expiration of the U.S. sanctions framework and the recent high-level contacts between Eritrean and American officials have opened political space that did not exist only a short time ago. Reuters reported on October 5 that Eritrea is attracting renewed attention partly because of its Red Sea position and the rapidly changing security environment in the Middle East. Eritrea should use that attention to attract investment, develop infrastructure, strengthen its ports and widen its diplomatic options, not allow the country to be valued only as a strategic piece in somebody else’s confrontation. (reuters.com)
That makes avoiding another Eritrea-Ethiopia war more important, not less. Eritrea should prepare seriously for any threat to its territory because preparedness is one of the best ways to discourage miscalculation. But deterrence and diplomacy are not opposites. A country can make clear that its borders are non-negotiable while leaving the door open to commercial cooperation and peaceful relations. Eritrea does not have to reject Ethiopia’s need for maritime trade in order to reject Ethiopian sovereignty over Eritrean territory. In fact, making that distinction repeatedly may be one of Eritrea’s strongest diplomatic arguments. Ethiopia can have access. It can have trade. It can negotiate port arrangements. What it cannot demand is ownership.
There is another reason for caution. Wars acquire their own momentum. Accusations become facts in the public imagination, retaliation produces counter-retaliation, and soon governments are explaining why they had no choice but to do what only weeks earlier seemed unthinkable. Eritreans and Ethiopians do not need another lesson in how that process ends. The 1998-2000 border war began in an atmosphere of escalating disputes and eventually consumed tens of thousands of lives. The last Tigray war brought another enormous human toll to northern Ethiopia and affected Eritrea as well. Young people on both sides of the border would again carry the burden if political rhetoric became military action. Taking the current threats seriously should therefore mean working harder to prevent war, not treating war as unavoidable.
The facts already justify concern without embellishment. Ethiopia has made access to the Red Sea a national priority. Abiy Ahmed reiterated that position again on October 5 while saying Ethiopia would pursue it through negotiation. Eritrea believes the language of sovereign access threatens its territorial integrity. Abraham Belay has now publicly warned of a stronger Ethiopian response against Eritrea while accusing Eritrea of involvement in the Tigray conflict, an allegation Asmara denies and that has not been independently established. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have collapsed. None of this proves that Ethiopian troops have been ordered to march toward Assab. But neither should Eritrea behave as though these developments are unrelated.
That is the real Eritrean question after the fall of Mekelle. It is not simply whether fighting in Tigray crosses into Eritrea. It is whether Ethiopia’s internal war, its campaign for sovereign sea access, its accusations against Eritrea and increasingly confrontational political rhetoric are beginning to converge into something more dangerous. Whether Ethiopia could successfully seize Eritrean territory, or whether it would ever attempt to do so, remains to be seen. What should not remain open to debate is the principle involved. Ethiopia’s economic need for the sea cannot confer sovereignty over Eritrean land. Commercial access can be negotiated. Transit can be negotiated. Port use can be negotiated. Regional economic integration can be negotiated. Eritrea’s sovereignty, internationally recognized borders and territorial integrity cannot.
