A coalition of self-proclaimed experts on the Horn of Africa is currently lobbying the new Trump administration to formally recognize Somaliland and support regime change in Eritrea. These initiatives are championed and propagated by individuals whose primary objective seems to be fostering instability under the pretext of promoting freedom and self-determination for local populations. However, their deeper motivations are evident: they aim to establish dominance over strategically significant regions and exploit the natural resources within these nations.
Somaliland
The region serves as a crucial corridor for international trade and maritime navigation. Amid ongoing geopolitical tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, there has been significant discourse surrounding the implications of U.S. recognition of Somaliland, particularly in light of strategic military interests in the area. This includes Israel’s establishment of a military base to monitor Iranian activities and its proxies in Yemen.
Proponents argue that U.S. acknowledgment of Somaliland’s independence could be pivotal in curbing Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, it is claimed that such recognition could yield strategic advantages for Ethiopia. However, advocates of these positions often overlook the potential ramifications on regional stability and security dynamics.
Regime Changes in Eritrea
In recent weeks, individuals such as Michael Rubin and Martin Plaut, alongside other proponents of interventionist policies, have demonstrated a concerted effort to advocate for regime change in Eritrea. This campaign includes facilitating the establishment of a government-in-exile that lacks recognition or legitimacy among the Eritrean populace. Furthermore, it provides support to various political opposition groups, some of which have historically called for the territorial disintegration of Eritrea and have aligned themselves with adversarial factions in neighboring countries intent on undermining Eritrean sovereignty.
Certain oppositional factions are effectively instruments used to destabilize and dismantle Eritrea, serving the interests of external actors aiming to erode national unity and undermine Eritrean identity.
One might question the rationale behind their aggressive advocacy for such inherently destructive and intolerable actions. The answer lies in their disregard for the associated costs and ramifications. Their primary concern is narrowly aligned with their own vested interests.
How Should We Confront Them?
International legal frameworks may pose challenges to the Trump administration’s potential recognition of Somaliland. However, historically, U.S. leadership has often prioritized national interests over adherence to international legal standards.
It is crucial for the people of the region to remain critically aware of the narratives and disinformation propagated by those seeking to sow discord among nations, as these tactics often create a conducive environment for exploitation.
While significant reform and transformation of socio-political landscapes are needed across all countries in the region, these changes must originate from the people themselves. Reform processes should be rooted in local communities and led by the citizenry, ensuring ownership and sustainable outcomes. External influences, often motivated by self-serving interests and indifferent to the long-term welfare of these societies, must not dictate the path to reform. Instead, the power to shape these changes should remain firmly in the hands of local stakeholders.
The President of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia signed a treaty to resolve their dispute stemming from the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the secessionist Somaliland in January 2024.
What Was the Ankara Deal?
The Turkey-brokered deal is not yet final or binding, but it represents an agreement by both countries to begin negotiations regarding Ethiopia’s claim for sea access. According to the treaty, both countries agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and collaborate to find common ground for enhancing commercial and trade exchanges, which would benefit the countries and the region.
What Did the Leaders Say?
Soon after the treaty was signed, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister stated, “Ethiopia respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia, but any agreement or deal they make with Somaliland is out of the business of the Republic of Somalia.” This contradictory statement signals that the Ethiopian government may not intend to fully respect the treaty.
Although both leaders affirmed their willingness to talk and resolve disputes, the conflict is far from over, with no significant breakthroughs achieved. Both sides appear to be buying time to strengthen their respective positions for the unresolved issues.
What Will Happen to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)?
In the recent election in Somaliland, a new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, assumed office and nominated a foreign minister known for opposing the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the former administration with Ethiopia. This indicates that the people of Somaliland, an autonomous region, are largely against any deals with Ethiopia. Furthermore, the newly elected president has announced plans to review the agreement, emphasizing its lack of transparency and casting doubt on its validity. The situation remains unclear, but given the region’s history, significant developments could occur.
Regional and Future Perspectives
After the signing of the treaty in Ankara, reports emerged that militias in Jubaland, allegedly supported by Ethiopian soldiers stationed in Somalia since 2006 under the pretext of fighting al-Shabaab, engaged in clashes with the federal army. Unverified reports suggest that several federal government soldiers were killed, with many fleeing to Kenya before returning to Somalia. Concurrently, a delegation from Somalia led by the Foreign Minister arrived in Ethiopia to initiate work on normalizing relations under the Ankara Treaty.
On December 21, 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Ethiopia in what appeared to be a politically motivated move amidst his domestic challenges. The Ethiopian Prime Minister welcomed Macron with an unprecedented ceremony, yet the visit yielded no tangible outcomes. Macron declined to support Ethiopia’s bid for sea access, emphasizing that such matters depend on the consent of sovereign nations, thereby reaffirming international law regarding territorial integrity. This outcome highlighted the Prime Minister’s diplomatic failure.
Subsequently, the Somali President visited Eritrea, following an earlier visit to Mogadishu by Egypt’s Foreign Minister. These visits signal to Ethiopia that Somalia is not diplomatically isolated.
Somali President in Addis Ababa
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Ethiopia on January 11, 2025, following his attendance at an African agriculture summit in Uganda. His office described the visit as a follow-up to the Ankara Treaty, aiming to resolve disputes and begin technical negotiations by February’s end. However, analysts believe the visit primarily sought to appease Turkish mediators, on whom Somalia heavily relies for security and economic support.
Ethiopia’s Position
Ethiopia appears isolated in its approach, which has been perceived as disingenuous and unacceptable to regional actors. Instead of seeking external and colonial powers’ assistance to destabilize the region, Ethiopia should pursue respectful bilateral agreements to foster mutual growth and stability. The sovereignty of Red Sea nations must remain inviolate.
Conclusion
As 2025 begins, the United States’ regional policy under President Donald Trump remains unclear. The Middle East, particularly Yemen’s ongoing crisis, continues to impact regional geopolitics, with implications for security and stability. Middle-power nations such as Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran also play crucial roles, while major powers like the European Union, China, and Russia monitor developments closely to safeguard their strategic interests.
The Ankara Treaty underscores the need for African-led solutions to African problems. Organizations such as the African Union and IGAD should have taken the lead in addressing the dispute. Ethiopia must recognize that regional collaboration is the only sustainable path toward peace and prosperity.
Introduction:- Michael Rubin’s recent comparison of Eritrea to North Korea, coupled with his advocacy for sanctions and regime change, presents a dangerously flawed narrative. By oversimplifying Eritrea’s history and challenges, Rubin disregards the devastating consequences of foreign interventions.
Eritrea is not North Korea. It is a nation shaped by decades of colonial oppression, a grueling war for independence, and persistent external pressures. While the country faces severe internal challenges—such as a total absence of political space, economic stagnation, and lack of rights—meaningful change must come from within, led by Eritreans. Imposed regime changes have repeatedly proven catastrophic, as seen in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Eritrea’s history demands solutions rooted in sovereignty and self-determination, not external dictates.
Eritrea’s Distinct Context
1. A Legacy of Struggle
Eritrea achieved independence in 1993 after a 30-year armed liberation war against Ethiopian annexation. This protracted struggle deeply entrenched the principles of self-reliance, sovereignty, and self-determination in the national psyche.
2. Regional and Global Pressures
Strategically situated along the Red Sea, Eritrea is at the heart of geopolitical dynamics. Sanctions during the 2000s and continuous external pressure have compounded Eritrea’s efforts to develop. These conditions inform policies aimed at safeguarding its sovereignty, even when such policies result in internal strains.
Eritrea’s Internal Challenges
Eritrea’s emphasis on sovereignty has safeguarded its independence, but the country’s internal governance issues require urgent reform:
1. Absence of Political Space
Eritrea operates under the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Political pluralism has yet to take root in the country. No opposition or mechanisms for political participation currently exist. This lack of political pluralism has created unease among citizens and affected the country’s relations with the international community.
2. Economic Stagnation
The country’s economy has suffered significant stagnation. For a nation that has faced decades of existential threats, sanctions, and systematic isolation, this is not unexpected. Despite these challenges, Eritrea has achieved considerable progress in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and water and soil preservation. These achievements can serve as a foundation for sustainable development once the country’s priorities shift from safeguarding its sovereignty to pursuing economic recovery. However, the centralized economic model limits private sector opportunities, leading to youth unemployment and significant migration. Structural reforms and economic diversification are essential to address these systemic issues.
3. National Service
Initially crucial for nation-building, the indefinite duration of Eritrea’s national service has become a source of public frustration. Addressing this through clear term limits and alternative career paths could restore the program’s original intent without alienating the youth.
The Dangers of Imposed Change
Rubin’s proposals mirror failed policies in countries subjected to external interventions, leading to profound destruction and instability:
1. Iraq
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq not only dismantled the country’s governance structures but also incited widespread sectarian violence, creating a volatile power vacuum. The lack of foresight in post-war planning resulted in weakened state institutions, rampant corruption, and a prolonged cycle of instability. The ripple effects include a fragmented nation, sectarian conflicts, and the rise of extremist groups like ISIS. Millions of Iraqis continue to endure displacement, poverty, and an uncertain future, underscoring the catastrophic outcomes of external interventions without sustainable frameworks for governance and reconciliation.
2. Libya
In 2011, NATO intervened in Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians during the Arab Spring uprising. The removal of Muammar Gaddafi, while intended to promote democracy, instead destabilized the nation profoundly. The resulting power vacuum created a breeding ground for militias, extremist groups, and human trafficking networks. Rival factions have since waged continuous warfare, fragmenting the country into competing territories controlled by local warlords. The centralized state system collapsed, leaving the population without access to stable governance, healthcare, or basic services. Libya’s chaos also reverberates regionally, fueling instability in neighboring countries and fostering transnational crime, further highlighting the perils of imposed regime change without a clear post-intervention strategy.
3. Yemen
Foreign-backed attempts to reshape Yemen’s political landscape ignited a catastrophic civil war. The conflict, initially sparked by internal disputes, escalated due to external involvement from regional and international powers vying for influence. The war has devastated Yemen’s economy, infrastructure, and social fabric, creating one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the modern era. Millions are on the brink of famine, displaced from their homes, and afflicted by widespread disease and poverty. Governance structures have collapsed, with large swathes of the country controlled by rival groups, leaving Yemen a fractured state unable to meet the basic needs of its people. This crisis underscores how external interference can exacerbate pre-existing tensions, plunging nations into unending turmoil.
These examples illustrate how imposed changes erode sovereignty, destroy governance, and leave ordinary citizens to suffer. Eritrea would face similar devastation if subjected to such measures.
Indigenous Reform as the Solution
The only sustainable path for Eritrea is through reforms led by its people, preserving sovereignty while addressing pressing challenges:
1. Economic Diversification
Fostering private sector growth, entrepreneurship, and investment can create jobs, reverse migration trends, and unlock Eritrea’s untapped potential in industries such as agriculture and energy.
2. Gradual Political Reform
Introducing mechanisms for public discourse, political participation, and civic engagement can build trust and improve governance. Gradual reforms can maintain stability while addressing systemic issues.
3. National Service Restructuring
Fixing term limits and creating alternative pathways for civilian careers can address grievances while maintaining the program’s developmental contributions.
4. Respect for Civil Liberties
Allowing independent media, guaranteeing freedom of expression, and enabling civic participation would empower Eritreans to contribute constructively to the country’s future and strengthen its global reputation. These reforms can create a more inclusive, prosperous Eritrea without compromising its sovereignty.
Constructive Engagement with Eritrea
The international community must reject coercive measures and instead focus on collaborative engagement: Dialogue: Respectful and constructive engagement can foster trust and cooperation. Support Development: Investments in education, infrastructure, and trade empower Eritrea’s citizens without undermining their sovereignty.
Reject Sanctions and Interventions: Punitive actions harm ordinary citizens and entrench government resistance, achieving the opposite of the intended outcomes. Constructive international engagement is key to promoting reform and progress.
Conclusion:- Eritrea’s history, marked by resilience and a commitment to sovereignty, demands solutions rooted in self-determination. The absence of political space, economic stagnation, and lack of rights must be addressed, but meaningful reform must come from within. Imposed change, as advocated by Rubin, risks plunging Eritrea into chaos, as seen in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.
Eritreans alone must chart the course of their nation’s future, supported by international engagement that respects their sovereignty. By embracing internal reforms and rejecting imposed solutions, Eritrea can address its challenges, secure its independence, and move toward a stable and prosperous future for its people.
Recently, online discourse has erupted over two opposition figures, Daniel Teklai and Kemal Ali, who now identify as reformists. Accusations of betrayal and abandonment of core principles have been levied against them, painting their presumed decision to engage with the government as treacherous. These accusations, however, seem overly reactionary and fail to consider the broader context and potential implications of their actions.
For years, the Eritrean opposition has experienced cycles of support and decline, largely dictated by geopolitical shifts and domestic or related international events. For instance, support surged during key moments of public outrage: the 2013 Lampedusa tragedy, when the Eritrean government dismissed the victims as “illegal Africans”; Isaias Afwerki’s 2017 declaration that the 1997 Constitution was “a dead document”; and the infamous “aykesernan” (“we didn’t lose anything”) remark during the peace agreement with Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed.
The opposition faced its most significant setback in 2020 during the Tigray War, when factions sided with the TPLF and TDF, alienating many Eritreans. Subsequent events, such as the rise of the extremist Brigade N’Hamedu group, further eroded trust. This left some opposition members feeling compelled to align with the government to avoid being labeled unpatriotic. Others retreated into silence, and many concluded that decades of opposition efforts had failed to bring meaningful change. Against this backdrop, the idea of reforming the ruling PFDJ began to gain traction.
It is difficult to say whether the PFDJ will reform under Isaias Afwerki’s leadership. History offers little hope: the G-15’s push for political reform resulted in imprisonment, and others advocating for change have met similar fates. Yet, Isaias will not live forever, and the political landscape is inevitably changing. The PFDJ’s 75-member politburo is dwindling due to age, imprisonment, and defections. The same applies to the Eritrean National Assembly. The current system has yielded a collapsed economy, a mass exodus of Eritreans, and severe brain drain. For Eritrea to survive and thrive, reform is not just an option—it is a necessity.
Whether Daniel and Kemal’s dialogue with government officials will succeed remains uncertain, but their efforts represent a bold departure from the status quo. To those accusing them of betrayal, consider this: if a strategy has failed repeatedly for 24 years, does it not make sense to explore alternative approaches? Every Eritrean shares the same aspirations: a prosperous economy, rule of law, and an inclusive political system. It is counterproductive to shame those who dare to try something new when existing methods have yielded no tangible results.
The Eritrean opposition has largely functioned as a pressure group, raising awareness about Eritrea’s challenges through lobbying efforts, presentations at the United Nations, and reports to human rights organizations. While this awareness is valuable, the core issues are well-known. Proposed solutions, such as robocalling, sanctions, regime change advocacy, and protests, have not achieved meaningful change. If anything, the government has weaponized these efforts to strengthen its narrative and discredit the opposition.
This leaves us with one untried option: engaging with the government to advocate for reform. Skepticism about the government’s willingness to change is justified, but at least Daniel and Kemal are attempting something different. Their actions should not be dismissed outright but rather evaluated in the context of Eritrea’s dire need for transformation.
For meaningful change to occur, Eritreans must prioritize unity over division. A comprehensive dialogue involving Eritreans at home and in the diaspora is essential. Infantile name-calling and defamation campaigns on social media serve only to undermine efforts for progress. Pragmatic revolutionaries must rise above such tactics to foster cooperation and consensus.
Currently, a grand objective of General Tsadkan Gebretensae and his old colleagues like Gebru Asrat is to create conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. General Tsadkan thinks the only way for him to consolidate power in Tigray is to have a federal army on the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. He falsely claims the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) old guard, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, is communicating and trading gold with Eritrea. He considers that a threat to his power in Tigray. He wants the federal army to apprehend the Debretsion-led TPLF old guard and dismantle the TPLF-loyal Tigray Defense Force (TDF) generals.
In his new book titled “Azurit”, another senior inner-circle Tigrayan general, Yohannes Gebremeskel, lists General Tsadkan among the few Tigrayans who secretly met, decided, and planned an attack on the Northern Command. The Northern Command was attacked by 200,000 Tigray Special Forces and militia on November 4, 2020. General Tsadkan, who was fired by Meles Zenawi for his dismal war planning in the Tserona front during the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrea border war, is very eager to return to power not only in Tigray but also in the federal government.
The irony is that the Northern Command, which he decided and planned to attack and dismantle four years ago, is now being called upon by him to come to the Ethio-Eritrea border to protect him from the TPLF and TPLF-loyal generals. Why is General Tsadkan, who built his name as a leader of the TDF during the 2020–2022 Tigray War, now afraid of the TDF? Why is his friend Gebru Asrat calling the TDF a protector of the Adwa dynasty and warning it not to take power in Tigray? Who is General Tsadkan?
He was chief of staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces (ENDF) from 1991–1998.
When the border problem between Eritrea and Ethiopia started in Badme and Bada areas (1996–1998), he was the chief of staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces. He was also a member of the Ethio-Eritrean committee tasked to resolve the border problem before it erupted into a full-fledged war. He oversaw the brigade that crossed into Eritrea through Adi Murug (Bada) and dismantled the Eritrean administration, closed schools, and expelled teachers from the area. His friend Gebru Asrat was the president of the Tigray region, doing his bidding in the border areas and beating the drum of war until this day. Thus, we can safely conclude that General Tsadkan was the architect of the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrea border war.
During the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrea War
During the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrea border war, General Tsadkan planned to attack Eritrea on the Tserona front, Egri Mekel. He planned to break the Eritrean defense line using close to 12,000 infantry, 5,000 Tigrayan civilians with donkeys, and a large 20th mechanized division. As written by General Yohannes Gebremeskel and by Tesfaye Gebreab, it was carnage.
After the war ended in a complete defeat, General Tsadkan himself said, “I have led many battles in my career. I have fought in many wars. I have seen a lot. I have never experienced this kind of utter failure. It is bad.” His army was decimated, and Tsadkan had to flee ten miles away to save his life, crying on his way.
In a war review conducted in Infara (Tigray), General Tsadkan’s crying continued, and it was decided he should be fired and gradually pass his position to General Samora Yonus. In revenge for his defeat in Egri Mekel, Tsadkan ordered his army to rape Eritrean women in Kohito and other areas around Senafe, Eritrea. Such crimes are documented in the Red Cross office in Geneva, Switzerland.
Also, after losing hope in his plan to march to Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, Tsadkan ordered the capture of Assab. That also ended in a disastrous defeat. Now Tsadkan wants to try again. “You cannot teach an old dog a new trick.”
After the 1998–2000 Border War
Suddenly, General Tsadkan, who was fired from his position of chief of staff due to incompetence, became a millionaire in Ethiopia. How can a fired general in the Ethiopian Defense Forces, with a meager pension salary, become a millionaire overnight? He owned villas in Addis Ababa and was a major partner in a beer factory in Tigray. What was the source of that money? He was a conflict entrepreneur. Possibly, the money was stolen from the salaries of close to 100,000 deceased Ethiopian soldiers during the war.
During the 2020–2022 Tigray War
Up to the time leading to the Qeerroo (Oromo youth) revolt that expelled the TPLF from the federal government seat in Addis Ababa, General Tsadkan was writing articles supporting the revolt against the TPLF. Later, he became a regular in Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s office.
Surprisingly, General Tsadkan reversed course, traveled to Tigray, and became one of the top people who secretly decided and planned the gruesome attack on the Northern Command. This attack sparked the Tigray War and led to the immense suffering of the Tigrayan people.
Inviting the Ethiopian Federal Army to the Ethio-Eritrea Border
General Tsadkan has already forgotten that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border is currently free of the federal army because he decided to neutralize the Northern Command. Now, General Tsadkan, who boasts of commanding 270,000 Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), wants the Northern Command to return to the border to defend him from the TPLF old guard and TPLF-loyal TDF generals.
Pretoria Agreement and Tsadkan’s Unfulfilled Expectations
When Tsadkan signed the Pretoria surrender agreement, his main expectation was to hold on to power in Tigray and create a conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Conclusion:- If the Tigrayans believe that Tsadkan and Gebru Asrat would bring peace and democracy to Tigray, they are wrong. Tsadkan and Gebru have only one objective: to hold on to power in Tigray and avenge the TPLF for firing them during the 1998–2000 war.
All their agenda is laced with revenge and greed for power. As birds of a feather flock together, they are coordinating with others who have similar grievances. Will they succeed? Time will tell.
2024 has seen record arrivals, tragic losses of life, and controversial policy shifts define the migration landscape of Europe. Migration routes across the Canary Islands, the English Channel, and the Central Mediterranean have been agitating a lot, while governments in key host countries like Germany and, in some ways, the wider European Union have passed both progressive measures and some quite restrictive ones amid an unabated rise of anti-immigrant sentiment around the continent.
More than 43,000 migrants made landfall on the Canary Islands from West Africa last year—a record high for the country. The immigrants who crossed, with the majority of them originating from Mali, Senegal, and Morocco, used one of the deadliest migration routes in the world. These treacherous crossings killed over 9,700 lives in these crossings.
The local authorities, which could not handle the arrival of migrants, claimed €100 million in emergency funding from the central government of Spain. Larger requests for structural reform and for better management of migration over the longer term have, by and large, gone ignored.
But the Channel was turning treacherous: more than 70 migrants died in 2024, against the combined total of about 40 in the two years beforehand. Yet despite increased patrols on French beaches, migrants continued to attempt it in ever larger numbers, often in small, unsubstantial dinghies that were grossly overcrowded.
Cooperation between the UK and France has failed to arrest the crisis, and while anti-migrant rhetoric builds in both nations, so the tension among the public appears to be growing.
During the months of April and May, the long-argued asylum pact has been adopted to harmonize the migration policy by European Union nations. While celebrated as a breakthrough by many, for several others it undermined the right to asylum while expanding punitive measures against the refugee.
The pact reflects deep political divisions inside the EU, with the wealthier nations calling for tougher border control while leaving countries on the front line like Italy and Greece to deal with the humanitarian burden.
The number of arrivals to Italy traveling via the Central Mediterranean as of 2024 numbered 65,000, lower than more than 153,000 the previous year. The controversial migration bargain between Tunisia and Italy should be one reason.
Despite fewer crossings, the route is considered one of the deadliest this year, with over 1,600 deaths recorded so far. Humanitarian organizations have criticized Italy’s restrictions on NGO rescue operations as leaving migrants more vulnerable out at sea.
In sprawling 2024 migration reforms, looser paths to citizenship [‘opportunity card’ included] were mapped out for Germany’s migrants; stricter measures imposed included nationwide payment cards and faster deportation procedures on asylum seekers.
This mixture of signals reflects the broader European trend of welcoming the skilled, but making life ever harsher for asylum seekers.
The events that have marked the year 2024 also mirror the same persistence of challenges that Europe faces while trying to address the question of migration. Some laws being promulgated on progressive principles notwithstanding, the general tendency of policymaking is toward restriction and increased anti-migrant vitriol. Systemic failures in political and economic areas, both in countries of origin and hosting countries, need to be confronted in order that genuinely viable solutions to the crisis are achieved.
Introduction: Recent discussions on Eritrean media platforms and online forums have attempted to draw parallels between the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the hypothetical collapse of Isaias Afwerki’s regime in Eritrea. However, I believe such comparisons are misguided. Similar predictions were made during the Arab Spring, a period that saw the overthrow of long-standing leaders like Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, yet Isaias remained firmly in power. Even when there was a coup attempt against Isaias two years after the Arab Spring (Forto 2013 Mutiny), he retained power due to his robust security apparatus. Furthermore, Eritrea’s unique historical, cultural, and societal context sets it apart from these nations, making a similar revolutionary wave highly unlikely.
Instead of focusing on speculative scenarios (because literally anything can happen in the Horn of Africa), the emphasis should shift towards planning for Eritrea’s reconstruction and rehabilitation. Whether through sweeping reforms by the PFDJ (though improbable) or the inevitable death of Isaias Afwerki (which could happen within a decade due to advanced age), Eritreans at home and abroad must prepare for the opportunity to launch their own version of a “Marshall Plan” for the nation’s future.
Eritrean Reconstruction Scenarios:
The reconstruction and development of Eritrea could follow one of two paths. The first would require the Eritrean government (PFDJ) to enact sweeping reforms that institutionalize the branches of government rather than treating them as auxiliary, establish a functional economic framework, implement a constitution, and foster dialogue and national reconciliation. Such measures would create an environment that encourages Eritreans abroad to return and contribute to rebuilding the country across critical sectors such as healthcare, industry, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, finance, and more. Eritrea’s diaspora includes thousands of skilled professionals with the education and expertise needed to drive this transformation. Failing to welcome those willing to contribute would be a monumental missed opportunity for the nation’s future.
However, meaningful reform cannot stop at cosmetic changes, such as appointing younger members to the politburo or replenishing the Central Committee to give the illusion of change while maintaining the status quo. True change requires dismantling or rectifying harmful policies that have stifled Eritrea’s progress. At present, trust between the Eritrean diaspora and the government regarding opportunities to return and support economic development is virtually nonexistent. Restoring this trust demands comprehensive political reform alongside sweeping economic changes. Only then can Eritrea harness the full potential of its diaspora to rebuild and thrive.
The second scenario envisions nature taking its course, with Isaias eventually passing away. In such a situation, a transitional committee of high-ranking government officials or military officers might take the reins until a successor is appointed (though this is purely my speculation). A new leader could potentially adopt a more progressive and pragmatic approach, moving away from Isaias’s rigid adherence to Maoist-Marxist ideology. History provides examples of such transitions—Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao Zedong after his death and implemented sweeping reforms that transformed China into a socialist market economy, blending state enterprises with private businesses. These reforms catalyzed China’s rise into one of the world’s largest economies.
If Eritrea were to experience a similar shift under new leadership, significant reforms could pave the way for a brighter future. Such changes would inspire confidence among Eritreans at home and abroad, motivating the diaspora to return and contribute to the country’s recovery and growth. However, this vision depends on the creation of an organized coalition representing Eritreans from all walks of life. This coalition must prioritize unity over petty politics, working collaboratively to rebuild Eritrea’s foundations. It should encompass professionals from the diaspora across sectors like education, healthcare, technology, engineering, and business, ready to partner with Eritreans inside Eritrea to restore the nation.
Conclusion:
The rebuilding of Eritrea demands more than hope; it requires vision, preparation, and collective action. Whether through reform within the existing government or a new era of leadership, Eritreans must focus on creating the conditions for sustainable development and national healing. The diaspora holds a critical key to this process, offering the skills, expertise, and resources needed to transform Eritrea into a thriving nation. By prioritizing unity, accountability, and strategic planning, Eritreans can turn a period of transition into a historic opportunity for renewal and progress.
On 08 December 2024, the longstanding regime of the Assad family came to an end. The Syrian regime is one of the last regimes to fall after several others in the last 30 years following the end of the Cold War.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad, the son of Hafiz al-Assad, came faster than anyone expected, but not as a surprise to those who follow the Middle East geopolitical landscape. The war in Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the near-complete destruction of the Syrian state—economically and socially—aggravated by draconian sanctions imposed by the USA and its Western allies, all contributed to the dramatic fall of the regime. It was surprising how the rebels, HTS, and other factions could conquer vast territories in just a few days without facing resistance from the Syrian Arab Army. Damascus fell without any opposition, and Bashar al-Assad left the country safely under Russian protection.
The Syrian regime has fallen but left behind a black hole of uncertainty and a state with multiple wounds. The healing process could be painful and challenging. Yes, Syrians deserve better, and they are right to be joyful about being rid of the brutal regime run by a family clan. However, the question remains: Who will lead the country, and how?
How Did the Regime Fall?
Countries neighboring Syria, particularly Israel and Turkey, have played a pivotal role in the country’s destabilization through their direct involvement in the prolonged conflict. Turkey has offered financial, political, military, and intelligence support to several Islamic factions within the rebel groups and has acted as a refuge for numerous terrorist organizations. Furthermore, under the guise of combating the PKK, which Turkey classifies as a terrorist group, Turkish forces have entered Syrian territory and established military bases there. There is a general consensus that the sanctions imposed by the West have severely weakened the economy. Moreover, we must acknowledge the United States’ seizure of Syrian oil, framed as a measure to combat terrorism. This action has further diminished the government’s revenue, which could have otherwise been used for reconstruction efforts and the provision of essential social services.
Is It the Change All Syrians Aspired For or Not?
It is too early to predict what the country’s future will look like because many regional and international actors are involved, and every country will work to maintain its interests and presence in Syria. Moreover, it is unclear who will govern the country, their general plan, or how they will lead the people. Almost all the military factions or wings of the opposition are extremist groups with a history of brutality and violence against people, particularly non-Sunni Muslims and other followers of non-Islamic faiths. In addition, there are numerous political factions with different backgrounds and political ambitions. Hence, the future of the country remains uncertain.
Do We Need to Follow the Syrian Path for Change in Eritrea?
A number of so-called opposition groups and regional political analysts have been commenting on the sudden fall of the Syrian regime and trying to correlate it to the intended changes in Eritrea. Though longstanding regimes and dictators must be overthrown by the people under them, sometimes external forces intervene in their interests.
In Eritrea’s case, the country’s history and the leadership’s structural makeup are unrelated to the Syrian regime. However, they might share similarities in their security apparatus and the core beliefs of the country’s non-religious or identity-based political administration. Nevertheless, the way in which the leadership came into power is entirely different. The Eritrean leadership emerged through a hard-fought liberation struggle, not a military coup. Moreover, it is represented by people who have contributed to the state’s independence, not by family or clan members. In addition, Eritrea is not in a civil war where different factions and external actors occupy the legitimate territories of the country.
Furthermore, the people of Eritrea have a deep-rooted national identity cultivated during the long struggle for independence and have been living in internal peace for years. The feeling of pride and honor of being Eritrean serves as the cornerstone for responsible action regarding any domestic political, economic, or other change. Eritrean people always prioritize the existence of their country and state and will never jeopardize the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, almost all Eritreans would agree that the path for change should and must be indigenous in nature, peaceful, and gradual, with initiatives driven solely by Eritreans both inside and outside the country.
Conclusion
The path for change in Syria was not wholly owned or, better to say, managed by the Syrian people; instead, several regional and international actors contributed, turning it into a combat zone for geopolitical competition and security interests.
In Eritrea, the change must be indigenous and gradual. In this case, the leadership in power must play a significant role in bringing about the desired change without pushing the state toward collapse and chaos, as seen in neighboring countries like Sudan. The opposition parties also need to take responsible action grounded in reality and understand the consequences of their blind desire for change through disastrous and externally manipulated reforms or so-called regime overthrows.
The Eritrean diaspora’s extraordinary $3 billion contribution to Uganda’s economy is set to be celebrated at the 2nd Eritrean Diaspora Investment Conference on December 21, 2024, at Palace Play Park in Kampala. Organized by the Office of the President in partnership with the Eritrean community in Uganda, the event will underscore the profound economic and cultural impact of Eritrean entrepreneurs.
The conference will host prominent figures, including Uganda’s Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja and Eritrea’s Ambassador to Uganda, Mohammed Sulieman Ahmed. Senior Presidential Advisor on Diaspora Affairs, Abbey Walusimbi, emphasized that the conference, themed “Unity Through Diversity,” aims to strengthen ties between Eritrean entrepreneurs and Ugandan stakeholders while building on last year’s success.
Walusimbi lauded the Eritrean community for their impressive economic contributions. Uganda is home to over 240,000 Eritreans, with 25% being entrepreneurs and innovators. “Their remarkable integration and business acumen are essential drivers of Uganda’s progress,” Walusimbi stated. “We commend their significant $3 billion contribution and the vital role they play in our nation’s economic development.”
The conference will celebrate Eritrean businesses’ success in sectors such as trade, hospitality, and manufacturing, alongside cultural festivities. Kisanet Tedros, CEO of Beles Bubu, highlighted the event’s importance, describing it as a space for both business and community bonding. “This conference brings us together to showcase the value the Eritrean community contributes to Uganda, culturally and economically,” she said.
Eritrean investor Kidane Ghebrehawariat Habteselassie stressed the importance of collaboration between the Eritrean diaspora and Uganda’s government, commending the country’s inclusive policies. “Uganda’s stability and openness have enabled Eritrean entrepreneurs to excel,” he remarked. “This platform allows us to strengthen shared goals and foster deeper collaboration.”
While the Eritrean diaspora thrives in Uganda’s business-friendly environment, similar opportunities are scarce within Eritrea itself. Strict economic policies, conflict fueled by Ethiopian aggression, and U.S. sanctions have limited private sector growth in Eritrea and curtailed international partnerships.
In contrast, Eritreans in nations such as South Sudan and Angola have excelled in sectors like trade, construction, and transportation. These successes demonstrate the transformative impact of stable policies and inclusive environments, offering a glimpse of Eritrea’s potential under reformed conditions.
The success of Eritrean entrepreneurs abroad highlights the vast untapped potential within Eritrea. If Eritrea were to embrace reforms promoting investment and private-sector growth, the nation could drive innovation, create jobs, and transform its economy.
To achieve this, Eritrea must implement business-friendly policies, address regional tensions, and rebuild international partnerships. Emulating Uganda’s inclusive policies could position Eritrea as a competitive player in regional trade and investment.
As Uganda celebrates the Eritrean diaspora’s $3 billion contribution, it showcases what can be achieved through unity and opportunity. The success of Eritrean entrepreneurs provides a powerful model for Eritrea’s future, emphasizing the potential for innovation, resilience, and economic growth when the right conditions are fostered.
The Eritrean diaspora’s remarkable impact on Uganda is not only a story of economic achievement but also an inspiration for transformative change and partnership between communities.
The Ankara Declaration, signed on December 11, 2024, between Ethiopia and Somalia, represents a significant diplomatic breakthrough in the turbulent geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Mediated by Türkiye and applauded by global powers such as the UK and the US, the agreement underscores the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of both nations. At its core, it establishes Ethiopia’s access to Somalia’s ports through mutually agreed bilateral arrangements, marking a crucial step toward rebuilding historically strained relations and unlocking economic cooperation.
This agreement has been heralded as a rare positive development in a region too often beset by conflict, rivalry, and unresolved historical grievances. However, amid the optimism lies a degree of skepticism, particularly within Ethiopia and Eritrea, where historical precedent gives cause for caution. Past failures of regional agreements in the Horn of Africa serve as stark reminders of the challenges ahead.
Jawar Mohammed’s Assessment: Ethiopia’s Changing Port Strategy
Ethiopian political activist and critic Jawar Mohammed has emerged as a leading voice dissecting the Ankara Declaration’s deeper implications for Ethiopia. He highlights the shift in Ethiopia’s maritime access strategy, which has been a cornerstone of Ethiopian foreign policy since the country lost its coastline following Eritrea’s independence in 1993.
From Somaliland to Somalia: Ethiopia had previously negotiated an agreement with Somaliland, an autonomous region seeking international recognition. This earlier deal controversially sought Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence in exchange for Ethiopian ownership of a portion of Somaliland’s ports. However, that agreement alienated Somalia, which maintains its claims over Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory. Under the Ankara Declaration, Ethiopia abandoned its ambition for port ownership and instead pursued a more internationally acceptable approach: negotiating port access under commercial agreements such as leasing. Jawar notes that this conforms to global standards like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but questions whether Ethiopia received equal value in this pivot.
Military Presence Adjustment: One of Somalia’s longstanding demands has been the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops operating in its territory. Ethiopian military presence, initially justified for countering terrorist groups like al-Shabaab, has been viewed by Mogadishu as a violation of its sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration signals Somalia’s softened stance, offering an opportunity for redefined military cooperation that aligns Ethiopia’s security interests with Somalia’s sovereignty concerns.
Strategic Cost-Benefit Analysis: Jawar’s critique is blunt: Ethiopia’s abandonment of the Somaliland deal in favor of the Ankara Declaration risks undermining the government’s diplomatic credibility. He terms this shift as a result of Ethiopia’s “wild ambition,” which sets lofty but poorly calculated goals. For Jawar, the current agreement ultimately places Ethiopia back at square one—dependent on external partners for maritime access without ownership or long-term guarantees.
The Global Perspective: Broad Diplomatic Endorsement
The Ankara Declaration has generated considerable support from international actors, who view the agreement as a stabilizing development in a historically volatile region.
The United Kingdom welcomed the agreement, praising its reaffirmation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and Türkiye’s role in guiding the talks. The UK emphasized its ongoing commitment to supporting regional stability and inclusive governance.
The United Stateslikewise endorsed the declaration as a critical step forward. Recognizing Somalia’s sovereignty, the US also urged Ethiopia and Somalia to enhance their collaboration in counterterrorism efforts, particularly against al-Shabaab, which remains one of the most significant threats to peace in the Horn of Africa.
The international community’s reaction underscores three key elements of the agreement: a reduction in bilateral tensions, new economic pathways for cooperation, and a strengthened framework for counterterrorism—a shared interest for both Somalia and Ethiopia’s allies.
Historical Parallels and the Eritrean Perspective
For critics like Eritrean analyst Engineer. Suleiman A. Hussein, Ethiopia’s track record in honoring agreements raises significant concerns about the Ankara Declaration’s durability. Suleiman references notable instances in the Horn of Africa’s history where Ethiopia either ignored or dismantled key diplomatic commitments, fueling mistrust among its neighbors:
Federation Agreement (1952): After Eritrea’s federation with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian monarchy under Haile Selassie gradually eroded Eritrean autonomy, leading to annexation in 1962. This breach sparked a 30-year struggle for independence, which culminated in 1993.
Algiers Agreement (2000): Following the bloody Eritrea-Ethiopia War, the Algiers Agreement sought to resolve border disputes, with the International Boundary Commission ruling in favor of Eritrea. Ethiopia’s failure to honor this verdict prolonged hostilities and deepened mutual distrust.
Asmara Declaration (2018): Celebrated as a reconciliation between Eritrea and Ethiopia under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the agreement generated high hopes but faltered due to unimplemented provisions. Eritrean leaders argued that Ethiopia’s initial goodwill faded amid shifting domestic and regional calculations.
For Eritrea and others observing the Ankara Declaration, the question remains: will Ethiopia honor its commitments this time, or will history repeat itself? Suleiman warns that without accountability and mutual trust, the Horn risks repeating past mistakes.
Türkiye’s Mediating Role: A New Model of Engagement
Türkiye’s successful mediation highlights a growing trend of non-Western powers playing constructive roles in African geopolitics. Unlike former colonial powers, whose engagement is often colored by historical baggage, Türkiye’s presence has been welcomed as a relatively neutral and pragmatic force. Türkiye’s mediation approach emphasizes dialogue, respect for sovereignty, and mutual development—a style that has resonated in nations like Somalia, where Türkiye has deepened its political, economic, and infrastructural ties over the last decade.
For Somalia, engaging in the Ankara Declaration represents a mature step toward balancing sovereignty with economic pragmatism. Facilitating Ethiopia’s port access aligns with Somalia’s ambitions for growth while solidifying regional cooperation.
Challenges and Conditions for Success
While the Ankara Declaration presents an opportunity for stability and progress, its success is not guaranteed. Both nations must take deliberate steps to ensure the agreement’s longevity and avoid falling into historical patterns of conflict or mistrust.
Commitment to Implementation: Concrete actions—such as executing port agreements, clarifying troop withdrawals, and fostering joint economic initiatives—are critical. Without clear deliverables, the agreement risks fading into irrelevance.
Transparent Communication: Public skepticism, particularly within Ethiopia, highlights the need for leaders to articulate the practical benefits of the agreement. Effective communication can reduce political backlash and build trust.
Upholding Sovereignty: For Somalia, the deal’s success hinges on Ethiopia’s respect for its sovereignty. Any deviation, intentional or perceived, could unravel progress and reignite tensions.
Conclusion: Cautious Hope for the Horn of Africa
The Ankara Declaration embodies a rare window of opportunity for Ethiopia and Somalia to reset their relationship and lay the groundwork for long-term cooperation. At a time when the Horn of Africa faces pressing challenges—including economic hardships, terrorism, and political instability—the agreement’s potential benefits are significant.
However, the region’s history warns against unchecked optimism. Ethiopia and Somalia’s leaders must demonstrate political will, mutual respect, and a commitment to their promises. Only then can the Ankara Declaration transcend rhetoric and usher in an era of peace and prosperity.
In a region that has suffered from decades of mistrust and conflict, hope, tempered by the lessons of history, remains essential for forging a stable and cooperative future.
