Dear readers,

a few weeks ago – technically last year, even though the change of calendar matters more than the actual time elapsed – I wrote a short piece to share some reflections on the year that had just ended. It was simply a personal stocktaking, a brief assessment of the past year rather than a fully developed argument.

At the beginning of the new year, I came across an article published on Red Sea Beacon, written by David Yeh, focused on Eritrea’s political economy, the idea of self-reliance, and the rejection of debt. The article circulated widely on social media and was also shared by institutional profiles, including that of Eritrea’s Minister of Information.

I know little about the author beyond the fact that he writes regularly on issues related to the Horn of Africa and Eritrea. Regardless of this, I decided to comment publicly on his article. He replied to my comment, and from there a brief but meaningful exchange developed.

For the sake of completeness, in the paragraphs that follow I will reproduce the exchange exactly as it took place, without omitting anything, quoting the relevant passages verbatim. This is meant to give readers a clear sense of the discussion itself, including those who may not have read the article from which it originated. I will conclude with a short personal reflection.

My comment

“There is a fundamental misunderstanding running through this narrative: the confusion of self-reliance with autarky. In a modern economy, development cannot be achieved by “doing everything alone.” To believe otherwise runs against any serious body of economic science, which shows that specialization, exchange, and interdependence are structural conditions of growth, not ideological deviations.

Likewise, the assumption that a long liberation struggle can automatically translate into an equally long period of endurance without tangible results is far from self-evident. Wartime discipline is not, in itself, a model of governance, and survival cannot be elevated into a permanent horizon. At this point, the crucial question is political before it is economic: was the population ever truly asked to bear the cost of these choices? Were they given the opportunity to decide whether this model of development—or rather, of deliberate non-development—was acceptable or not?”

Response by David Yeh

“Your critique presumes that interdependence is a neutral condition rather than a historically structured hierarchy. For societies emerging from domination, the issue is not whether exchange and specialization exist, but on what terms they occur and who captures the surplus they generate. What is dismissed as “autarky” is often a transitional strategy aimed at rebuilding decision-making capacity under conditions where integration has repeatedly meant subordination.

     Similarly, the claim that endurance lacks political legitimacy overlooks the fact that the original social contract of liberation movements was forged precisely around sacrifice in exchange for sovereignty. While wartime discipline cannot substitute indefinitely for governance, neither can immediate material returns be the sole measure of political consent in a context where external constraints remain decisive. The relevant question, therefore, is not whether costs were borne, but whether viable alternatives existed that did not reproduce dependency under a differen name.”

My reply

“David Yeh Thank you for your response, which I find thoughtful and stimulating. I largely agree with your starting premise: there is no neutrality in international political and economic power relations, and interdependence is often shaped by historically asymmetric structures. This is precisely what dependency theory, since the 1960s, has convincingly argued, and it remains a relevant analytical framework.

However, that same theoretical tradition also presupposes a minimum degree of internal dynamism within the societies it examines, a space, however constrained, in which policies can be adopted to foster development and growth. This is where, in my view, the Eritrean case reveals its core problem. Thirty-five years after independence, Eritrea exhibits virtually no internal economic dynamics. Domestic production is minimal, foreign trade is almost nonexistent, and only very recently has the country begun exporting raw materials, largely in cooperation with foreign companies, particularly Chinese ones.

If one wishes to give some credit to the government’s intentions, it is fair to acknowledge the efforts made in building basic infrastructure, such as dams, and in providing elementary education and healthcare. Yet these efforts were not accompanied by policies capable of stimulating even the most basic forms of economic activity. As a result, the most dynamic segment of the population has been forced to emigrate, where it often succeeds in creating small businesses and productive initiatives. Had even a fraction of this energy been allowed to operate within the country, some tangible signs of development would likely have emerged.

In fact, such a process had begun in the early years following independence, roughly between 1991 and 1997, before being abruptly interrupted by the border war and never resumed. Since then, Eritrea has existed in a continuous, undeclared state of emergency that has effectively suspended any prospect of institutional normalization.

For this reason, my central argument is that the primary issue is not theoretical debates about autonomy or dependency as such, but the absence of institutional normality. Without functioning institutions, predictable rules, and minimal space for economic and social initiative, even the most carefully justified strategy of self-reliance risks becoming detached from material reality.”

His response

“Your argument is analytically strong but assumes conditions of institutional normality that Eritrea has never enjoyed. Since the 1998–2000 border war, Eritrea has existed in a prolonged no war, no peace environment, compounded by illegal UN sanctions from 2009 to 2011. These externally imposed constraints severely limited trade, finance, and policy space, and their later removal without policy change confirms their political nature.

     The interruption of early post independence economic momentum was therefore not primarily institutional failure, but enforced militarization and resource diversion toward national survival. Under permanent security threat, economic liberalization and private-sector expansion were structurally constrained rather than simply neglected.

     Despite this, Eritrea achieved measurable gains in basic infrastructure, water security, primary, secondary and graduate education, healthcare, and debt avoidance outcomes that indicate constrained institutional functionality rather than absence. Emigration, often cited as evidence of internal stagnation, reflects suppressed domestic potential under sanctions and insecurity, not a lack of human capacity.

     The central issue, then, is not theoretical debates over autonomy versus dependency, but the systematic denial of institutional normality itself. Eritrea’s experience ultimately reinforces dependency theory’s core insight: yes development cannot be separated from coercive global power relations.”

My reply

“I understand your argument, but when you ask what viable alternatives existed, you are already moving onto a hypothetical plane. Dialectically, that is precisely the point: those alternatives were never even attempted. Without experimentation, without course correction, without a minimal plurality of options, it is difficult to argue that what we are dealing with was an unavoidable necessity rather than an ideologically frozen choice.

Moreover, the alternative has never been—neither in theory nor in practice—between total self-sufficiency on the one hand and external dependency on the other. Any normalized index or comparative analysis of development shows a wide spectrum of intermediate paths. Africa itself offers concrete examples of meaningful economic and social transformation over the past thirty years. Countries such as Rwanda or Morocco cannot plausibly be dismissed as merely externally directed, nor can it be denied that they have achieved significant internal development while retaining a degree of sovereign decision-making.

Thirty-five years is not a short time frame. It is more than sufficient to conduct a serious assessment of a model and, above all, to adjust economic and political choices over time in light of outcomes. When such adjustment does not occur, the problem cannot be attributed solely to external constraints; it points to an internal failure of institutional learning.

Finally, the use of the expression “economic democracy” is highly problematic. In political science there is a well-established category such as democratic centralism, but speaking of economic democracy presupposes the existence of a basic prerequisite: some form of real economic dynamism over which disagreement, deliberation, and political choice can meaningfully take place. In the Eritrean case, this foundation is absent. There is no genuine field of alternatives within which to agree or disagree, but rather an abstract model that remains just that—abstract.

From a comparative perspective, the closest analogy is the early phase of Maoist China: a rigid, ideologically driven system closed to empirical verification, which was later radically revised precisely because it had produced largely failure. After several decades, it is difficult to argue that posing the same critical question is illegitimate.”

His response

“your argument conflates the absence of ideal outcomes with the absence of constraint. Alternatives may exist in abstraction, but their feasibility is historically and materially conditioned. Eritrea’s choices emerged from a post liberation context defined by extreme security pressures, regional hostility, and sustained external interference, which sharply narrowed the space for experimentation you invoke. Comparison with cases like Rwanda or Morocco overlooks these structural differences and risks mistaking contingent success stories for universally available paths.

     Moreover, the demand for continual “course correction” presumes institutional stability and policy autonomy that Eritrea has rarely possessed. Institutional rigidity can be read not only as ideological freeze but as a defensive adaptation under prolonged siege. Finally, dismissing “economic democracy” for lack of dynamism reverses causality: the concept was precisely an attempt to build developmental capacity under constraint, not a claim that such capacity already existed. Historical analogies to Maoist China, while rhetorically powerful, flatten distinct geopolitical and temporal contexts and therefore illuminate less than they suggest.”

My final reply

“I understand the emphasis you place on historical and material constraints, and to some extent I share it. It is obvious that Eritrea emerged in a context very different from that of many other countries, and that security pressures, regional hostility, and sustained external interference significantly narrowed the range of available choices. That said, the critical weakness in your argument is that the appeal to constraints risks turning into a form of exceptionalism, as if the Eritrean case were so unique that it could no longer be subjected to comparison or, ultimately, to any meaningful criteria of evaluation.

That contexts differ is self-evident. But if every negative outcome is explained solely by invoking exceptional conditions, the question ceases to be political and becomes almost metaphysical. At that point, no strategy can ever be assessed, because any failure can always be attributed to external factors. Analytically, this is a dead end.

We can also conduct a simple thought experiment. Suppose the strategic trajectory pursued by the Eritrean government—self-reliance, political autonomy, rejection of external dependence—were to continue for another twenty years in the same way: without consent, without engagement with civil society, without mechanisms of course correction. Fifty years after independence, would an outcome marked by persistent impoverishment, mass emigration of a young and capable population, disastrous economic indicators, and the absence of reliable statistical data still be justifiable by appealing to the original constraints?

Any coherent strategy must be assessed in the short, medium, and long term. At the level of abstract models, one might even agree in part with the rationale of strategic and political autonomy. But if, over time, this approach produces a near-collapse in quality of life, no real growth, and no accumulation of productive capacity, then the problem is not only the context, but the strategy itself—and above all the way it has been imposed.

Finally, interpreting institutional rigidity solely as a defensive adaptation overlooks a decisive element: the total absence of consent and exchange with society. Without feedback, transparency, or data, it becomes impossible to distinguish between resilience under constraint and simple political failure. At that point, invoking “economic democracy” not as a project to be realized but as a permanent justification for outcomes that never materialize risks inverting the relationship between means and ends.

P.S.

Thank you in any case for the exchange. I am simply a thirty-year-old who loves his country and wants to see it grow and develop. I also wish that debates like the one we are having could take place inside our country—within institutions, in parliament, in journals, and in internal political forums. As you know, they cannot. And that fact alone already says a great deal about the difficulties we are going through in this historical phase.”

His final response

“Taking your age into consideration, I like the seriousness of your critique, and I agree that constraints cannot become a blanket exemption from evaluation. Any argument that renders a political trajectory immune to judgment risks analytical dead ends.

     Where I differ is in how constraints are interpreted. My point is not that Eritrea is beyond comparison, but that evaluation must be context sensitive rather than based on implicit benchmarks drawn from radically different historical and geopolitical conditions. The problem is not comparison itself, but false equivalence.

     The charge of exceptionalism would apply only if Eritrea were treated as analytically incomparable. That is not my position. Comparisons remain necessary but they must be made against cases shaped by similar conditions of insecurity, external pressure, and delayed institutional consolidation. Otherwise, judgment risks becoming normative rather than explanatory.

     Your thought experiment is valuable, but it assumes a static environment. Eritrea’s strategy of autonomy emerged under conditions of perceived existential threat, not as a purely ideological choice. One may argue legitimately that this perception has outlived its usefulness, but it cannot be dismissed as mere justification.

I agree most strongly with your critique regarding consent, feedback, and institutional learning. Even under constraint, the prolonged absence of internal debate, transparency, and data production is politically costly. At some point, defensive rigidity hardens into opacity, and autonomy risks collapsing into isolation.

     If there is a point of convergence between our positions, it is this: constraints matter, but they cannot indefinitely suspend accountability. The alleged debates like this cannot occur openly inside Eritrea is itself a central part of the misunderstanding that we can discuss on.”

Conclusion

This exchange is not the first time I have found myself discussing these issues with people from very different backgrounds. Some are acquaintances or friends, others interlocutors who tend to embrace the Eritrean government’s narrative built around the myth of self-reliance and political independence. This perspective often fits within what has been described, by authors such as Samir Amin, as a form of campism: a tendency to view governments and policies that position themselves against multinational corporations, international financial institutions, neoliberal ideology, and the United States as inherently progressive or emancipatory. From this angle, phenomena such as globalization and interdependence are read as mere continuations of colonial domination, and countries like Eritrea, Venezuela, or others are treated as unique models that cannot be assessed through indicators such as GDP, trade flows, or conventional measures of economic performance, but only through their supposed historical singularity.

My doubt, and my counterargument, starts precisely here. This presumed strategic autonomy comes at an immense cost, and that cost is borne by societies that have already endured decades of resistance, sacrifice, and bloodshed. It is not unreasonable to expect that, after so much suffering, people should see tangible improvements in their quality of life, economic growth, and shared well-being. The issue is not about being heroic, or about being celebrated as a model that refuses to bend to globalization, but about finding a realistic and humane balance in a world where no country can truly live in isolation.

From my perspective, a policy of neutrality, a genuinely multilateral approach, and economic cooperation with as many partners as possible would be far more appropriate for a country of Eritrea’s strategic importance. Combined with serious economic and fiscal reforms and with functioning institutions, such an approach could deliver development and prosperity to the population without compromising national sovereignty.

Bibliography:

Yeh. D. https://redseabeacon.com/eritreas-economic-democracy-and-the-ethics-of-self-reliance/