September is a time when people around the world reflect on issues of national security and terrorism, especially following the September 11th attacks, which profoundly changed how many nations approach their sovereignty and safety. Just seven days after the attacks, on the other side of the world, in a country called Eritrea, prominent government ministers, army generals, and politburo members of the EPLF/PFDJ were arrested after months of voicing their frustration with the handling of the 1998-2000 border war and the failure to achieve the objectives set out in the 1994 PFDJ National Charter. These objectives included establishing a constitutional government, institutionalizing all sectors and branches of government, and creating an economic policy that balanced egalitarianism with business competition in the private sector.

While many people take to social media to remember the heroes who were tragically taken from their homes at the dawn of September 18th, 2001, some Eritreans echo the government’s accusations that the G-15 committed “high treason,” “conspired with the enemy,” or were involved in a “Washington plot to overthrow the government.” However, I am surprised that no one (except for those grounded in discernment and pragmatism) has stopped to question why these claims have never been proven. If treason was indeed committed (and pardon my French), where the hell is the evidence? Were there phone calls, letters, emails, or secretly recorded meetings? And if so, have they been proven in a court of law, or at least shown to the public so it would be an open-and-shut case?

I have come to realize that the main issue with Eritrean political discourse, particularly when it comes to the political prisoners, is that many Eritreans tend to approach the topic emotionally rather than rationally. This is somewhat understandable, as the 1998-2000 border war was an incredibly sensitive time for Eritreans. During such a period, it’s natural for people to rally behind their government and set politics aside when their land and sovereignty are at stake. The war resulted in significant casualties, with many soldiers, reservists, and ordinary civilians losing their lives. Additionally, billions of dollars’ worth of property was destroyed. In the aftermath, both government officials and ordinary Eritreans, at home and abroad, were outraged and wanted answers.

When the Algiers Agreement was signed, bringing an end to the border war, questions arose within government cadres about whether the situation could have been handled better. Pressure mounted on the president to hold a congress or legislative session to review the war’s management and move forward with fulfilling the goals outlined in the PFDJ’s National Charter. As a result, during the National Assembly meeting of October 2nd, 2000, members of parliament called for the formation of a committee to review the government’s performance over the past decade. They also stressed the need for electoral laws, party formation regulations, and national elections, which were to be held by December 2001.

However, there was one critical issue: the President of Eritrea was also the President of the Assembly, meaning he alone had the authority to call the parliament into session. From October 2nd, 2000, until February 2nd, 2002, no legislative meetings were held. During this period, however, inter-PFDJ discourse between the president and the group we know as the G-15 intensified behind closed doors, with ongoing calls by the group to convene a session to follow up on the October 2nd agenda. February 2nd, 2002, would mark a turning point, which I will elaborate on later.

The frustration of the G-15 was then revealed to the public through the then-private press and interviews conducted by journalists with the G-15. The cat was out of the bag, and the public finally knew that there were problems brewing within the government. Every time the G-15 sent a letter asking the President to convene a meeting (ንኣኼባ ባይቶ ኣክቡና።), the President would respond by saying, “You are making a mistake.” This prompted the G-15 to publish an open letter to all PFDJ cadres (which can be found online), outlining how the agendas of October 2nd and the National Charter were being stalled. Their intent was to gain the support of other cadres to put pressure on the president to convene a meeting.

A few months after publishing the open letter, two planes struck the World Trade Center twin towers, as well as the Pentagon. While the world focused on the terrorist attack in the United States (which dominated the headlines for weeks), the President initiated a crackdown on dissenting members of the government, as well as journalists who wanted to share the G-15’s side of the story. They were snatched from their homes at the crack of dawn, shoved into cars, and driven away to an undisclosed location. Later, the government would accuse the G-15 of crimes that would give rise to what is now known as the “Pappagallo Effect.”

“The G-15 committed treason, crimes against the nation, disclosed information to enemies, and relayed intelligence to Weyane”—these are just a few of the many unsubstantiated accusations the government made against the G-15 and journalists. Remember how I mentioned the hunger among Eritreans for accountability over the border war? The government essentially used the G-15 as political scapegoats, with the president exploiting the situation to crack down on dissent and centralize power within the executive branch. Sadly, with many Eritreans being emotional in their politics, they fell for this narrative and truly believed the G-15 committed treason, rather than pressing for evidence to support such charges.

For those who truly believe they committed treason, I would like to share an excerpt by Saleh Younis from Eritrea Digest:

“…How did Aster Fessehazion do this exactly? And when did Germano Naty meet with peace facilitators? How did then-Foreign Minister Haile Derue communicate with the peace facilitators if Yemane Gebreab accompanied him everywhere ALL THE TIME? Or: what could compel people who spent most of their youth fighting for Eritrea’s independence, some in wars more severe than the Weyane offensives, to capitulate now?

It’s worth mentioning an incident during the Algiers Agreement negotiations, where Haile Drue Woldetensae and his entourage walked past Seyoum Mesfin and his group. Haile reportedly told Seyoum, “ኣንታ ዓጋመ! ከነርእየኩም ኢና,” which translates to, “You Agames, we will show you!” With that kind of remark, do you really believe Haile would covertly collaborate with Ethiopia or Washington against the very government he served, just for personal gain?

And what about General Ogbe Abraha, a man fully committed to the border war who lost many siblings to the Eritrean revolution? Is it reasonable to think he would suddenly turn against his country and betray everything he fought for? My fellow Eritreans, for the love of God, use common sense before accusing these individuals of sedition or treason.”

As for Fateful February, the February 2002 National Assembly met to condemn their own comrades, label them as traitors who raised “untimely questions,” throw away the October 2nd agenda and the goals outlined in the PFDJ charter, postpone elections and other political developments, and finally dissolve themselves in the process. This is why February 2nd was a fateful day for Eritrea. Twenty-two years later, many members of the Eritrean National Assembly and Central Committee have either died, gone into exile, or are in prison (with even the prisoners’ whereabouts unknown to their immediate family members).

This month, I want to not only honor the G-15 for their courageous stance—fully aware they would be targeted by their own comrades using Gedli-era tactics—but also to dispel the baseless accusations against them. We’ve all heard the saying, “When you repeat a lie over and over, it becomes the truth.” The last thing I want is for the founding fathers of Eritrea to be remembered as traitors. I hope this article will not only correct the false narratives surrounding the G-15, but also urge Eritreans to listen to both sides of the story, set aside emotions in political matters, and apply critical thinking when dealing with such issues.

Awet N Hafash,
Victory to Our Martyrs.