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What strategies should Eritrea and its citizens implement to counter the psychological warfare being waged by Ethiopia?

By
Afewerki Ghebremichael
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The political and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa reveal that Ethiopia is deliberately using social media as a weapon of psychological warfare against its neighbors, particularly Eritrea. This campaign relies on spreading targeted narratives and disinformation designed to influence public perception and destabilize regional relations.

It has now become routine to hear Ethiopian state media outlets such as FBC (Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C.), ETV, alongside countless YouTube channels and thousands of posts on X (formerly Twitter), echoing Ethiopia’s false claims over Eritrea’s Red Sea coast. Ethiopian academics and revisionist voices repeatedly insist that the younger generation must champion Ethiopia’s “right” to the sea. They frame coastal access as a historic and inherent entitlement, seeking recognition from the international community especially Western leaders and advocacy groups. Their rhetoric emphasizes the need to amplify Ethiopia’s voice globally, ensuring its aspirations receive legitimacy.

This campaign is not simply a bid to appeal to former colonial powers. It is rooted in a distorted reading of history and geography. Ethiopia has long sought to justify territorial claims by courting global powers, often through symbolic displays of subordination. One example is Eritrea’s federation with Ethiopia, a monarchy entrenched in feudalism, which was imposed with U.S. backing yet framed as a UN General Assembly decision. That federation not only absorbed Eritrea portrayed by Ethiopia as a divine possession—but also emboldened claims over Somalia, voiced by Ethiopian delegates during negotiations led by the UK, France, the USA, and the USSR on the future of Italian colonies.

Historical Context

Eritrea’s forced federation with Ethiopia was shaped primarily by U.S. strategic interests during the Cold War. Yet the Eritrean people had long asserted their right to independence, consistent with the principle of self-determination for nations that endured brutal colonial oppression marked by exploitation, discrimination, and genocide. This position was acknowledged by U.S. officials themselves. John Foster Dulles, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, bluntly stated:

“From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin and the considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.”

Even while justifying federation, Dulles admitted Eritrea was a sovereign nation with defined borders, a thriving economy, strong institutions, and a dynamic political life. This exposes the weakness of Ethiopia’s claim that Eritrea historically belonged to it. Eritrea was not absorbed into Ethiopia naturally; it was forced into a federation and nearly colonized by an African feudal empire, with foreign powers enabling the process.

Today, Ethiopia’s narrative of historic ownership over the Red Sea is a carefully crafted strategy meant to deceive global opinion and justify unlawful aggression. This propaganda is meticulously designed, blending selective history, manipulated imagery, and inflammatory rhetoric with diplomatic maneuvering. Most troubling are the open threats from Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, amplified by a state propaganda machine running at full force. These threats serve to distract from Ethiopia’s internal crises by shifting focus outward.

How should we fight this madness?

In an era where disinformation shapes global politics, countering it demands clarity, unity, and discipline. Propaganda thrives on emotional reactions, so Eritreans must resist being drawn into irrational debates. Instead, the response must combine national cohesion with active diplomacy, ensuring Eritrea’s voice is heard and respected by sovereign states around the world.

When defending territorial integrity, we must stress that neither population size nor landmass justifies violating international law or the UN Charter. Strengthening public knowledge of these legal frameworks is critical. A well-informed citizenry can dismantle conspiracy theories and counter revisionist narratives with facts and reason.

The guiding principle is straightforward:
“To have a country, you need a strong army. To have a strong army, you need a strong economy. To have a strong economy, your people must be prosperous. To make people prosperous, you need commerce.”

Building a strong, modern military requires addressing Eritrea’s demographic challenges with urgent reforms. Leadership must mobilize both citizens at home and the diaspora to reinvest in Eritrea and revive the stalled economy.

The Red Sea coastline is not just a defensive frontier it is a vital artery for trade and global connectivity. To safeguard it, Eritrea must focus on economic resilience rather than mere poverty alleviation. A strong economy can draw back Eritrean expatriates from across the world, encouraging them to repatriate, invest, and rebuild.

By fostering entrepreneurship and creating opportunities for youth, Eritrea can spark innovation and growth. Economic success will enable young Eritreans to build families and reverse demographic decline, ensuring a sustainable and secure future for the nation.

An Open Letter to George Dirar (G.Drar)

By
Daniel Mulugeta
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Running a media service – whether it is a television channel, a social platform like TikTok or YouTube, or a news site such as this one (setit.org) – carries immense responsibility. Media shape’s opinion, and for too long, Eritrean outlets have focused on appeasing audiences instead of challenging them. As Saleh Younis of Eritrea Digest noted in his article “The Horseshoeing of Eritrean Politics,” much of our media has been reduced to “feel-good” content rather than critical, intellectual argument. Ambassador Andeberhan once remarked in a book club discussion I attended that many Eritrean media personalities are “cringe and subpar” – an accurate critique. I was relieved when he said that because I knew I was not the only one that feels this way. Much of the media personalities and outlets we have are crap. That is the only adjective I think is fitting to describe the Eritrean media landscape. 

That being said, this brings me to today’s topic: the case of George Dirar.

 

George Dirar’s Early Purpose

In his early days on YouTube and social media, George offered Eritreans content rarely discussed in our community about how to invest, nurture healthy relationships, and understand human psychology. He would even go on to break the barriers as we thought some topics are considered “taboo” to discuss openly, like sexual activity/health. The point that I am trying to make is that at the time, his videos were thought-provoking, practical, and above all things  educational. He was for that period of time a positive force for all Eritreans worldwide.

The Pivot

This all changed in 2023 with the rise of “Brigade Nhamedu” an extremist group that sought to bring change through destructive acts  raiding festivals, damaging property, even committing arson. George rightfully condemned those attacks, but in doing so, he began drawing closer to the government, eventually evolving into a voice of propaganda. 

Like many others, I have become disillusioned with the Eritrean opposition. It is fractured by political, regional, and at times sectarian divides. Brigade Nhamedu’s actions pushed me to distance myself entirely; I no longer align myself with either camp. I now consider myself politically independent. Many Eritreans believe that when it comes to politics, you must choose one side or the other, or be called a “langa langa,” but quite frankly, I do not buy into such trivial and unintelligent name calling. I stand on principle. My only loyalty is to what is right for Eritrea. I will honor what is just and true, and I will challenge what is wrong and unjust, no matter who commits it.

George, however, has long abandoned that commitment. This is a man who once demanded the implementation of Eritrea’s constitution and the release of political prisoners, yet he now changes his politics as casually as one changes a T-shirt. Worst of all, he has recklessly reopened wounds that Eritreans have never healed—none deeper than the unresolved case of the G-15, a painful scar that continues to divide our people to this day.

George has resorted to recycling old interviews with figures like Sebhat Efrem and Zerai Haile, simply echoing the government’s narrative on the G-15 without offering any serious analysis or context. One of his earlier videos was even titled “Listen and Be the Judge.” But on a matter of this grave, presenting selective, one-sided material and then leaving the audience to “judge” is not only irresponsible—it is misleading. True judgment requires truth, and truth demands that both perspectives be heard before any serious conclusion can be drawn.

The reality is harsh and undeniable: the members of the G-15  men and women who sacrificed their youth and dedicated their lives to Eritrea’s liberation  have vanished without a trace. They have been denied even the most basic human dignity: the right to see their children, to embrace the grandchildren born long after their disappearance, to simply exist as human beings. To bring such a wound into public conversation is not a matter of casual reposting or opportunistic noise. It demands more. It requires moral clarity, deep analysis, and the courage to confront uncomfortable truths. The demand is simple and just: the G-15 must either be brought before a court of law or granted full pardon. Nothing less honors justice, nothing less honors the struggle they once waged for Eritrea’s freedom. 

Instead, the grim reality is that a good chunk of those members is believed to have died in prison, and their families have been kept in the dark about their fate. This silence is not just a political stance; but rather a profound human tragedy that marked the beginning of Eritrea’s political divide – one that was felt and more pronounced in the diaspora. It just surprises me that someone would repost this on the eve of the G-15’s 24 years since their disappearance. But as the saying goes, money talks. 

Thus, I turn my attention directly to George Dirar. You hold a moral obligation to apologize  not only to the families of the G-15 who have come across your video, but to the countless Eritreans who have been offended and disappointed by your recent videos and pivot. With the influence you command in Eritrean media, your responsibility should be to uplift the community and provide thoughtful, challenging analyses on the issues that concern the country. Instead, by recycling old propaganda under the guise of commentary (which is sheer laziness), you have chosen clicks and ad revenue over principle. Such opportunism reveals a greater concern for personal gain than for the people you claim to represent. 

One thing you must understand is that Eritrean politics swings like a pendulum. There may come a day when HGDEF doubles down once more, and opposition to the government surges again (in however shape or form that happens). But the measure of a man’s integrity is not whether she shifts with the political winds, but rather if he remains true to his principles and values. 

For me, through my time of being involved in Eritrean politics, those principles have never changed. Never once have I had second thoughts on the belief of implementing our constitution, adherence to rule of law, the release of political prisoners without due process, and the pursuit of genuine national reconciliation. These are the foundations of any just and normal society, and for me, they are non-negotiable. 

My hope in writing this open letter is that it prompts you to reflect – not only on how you conduct yourself online, but on the responsibility that comes with your platform. Regardless of what political season we are in, Eritrea deserves sincerity, independence of thought, and a politics rooted in the nation’s long-term well-being, not in fleeting alliances or opportunism.

Thank you. 

 

Dr. Dagnachew Assefa: A Prominent Source of Misinformation in Ethiopia.

By
Abel Kebedom
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Dr. Dagnachew Assefa is a familiar figure on Ethiopian government-owned television stations and associated YouTube channels. For readers who are not acquainted with his work, he is a former lecturer at Addis Ababa University who was dismissed by the then Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (EPRDF) government for reportedly mixing politics with education. Since that time, he has been a vocal critic of the former EPRDF government and an advocate for the current Prosperity Party Ethiopian government. He is known for strong opposition to the TPLF and those affiliated with it. When the 2020-2022 Tigray civil war erupted, he publicly expressed gratitude to the Eritrean government for assisting the Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party government during the conflict with the TPLF. Following the peace agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on November 2, 2022, and as the Abiy Ahmed government shifted its stance regarding Eritrea, Dr. Dagnachew’s public communications also shifted. He became a notable voice in the resulting discourse. His statements often include references to renowned scholars and varied quotations. However, these quotations are sometimes viewed as attempts to support his arguments. This article will address and examine statements from Dr. Dagnachew’s recent interview with the Ethiopian YouTube channel Andafta, which was broadcast on August 17, 2025. While several points could be discussed, this article will focus on four main claims.

Lie No.1: Ethiopia is the Most Stable Country in the Horn of Africa.

 

It is concerning when a person with advanced academic training makes public statements that are inconsistent with widely observed facts. Currently, Ethiopia faces significant challenges, including conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions. Reports indicate widespread extrajudicial killings of civilians and abductions for ransom near the capital, Addis Ababa. There are also reports of government-sponsored arrests driven by financial motives in the city. The Tigray region is described as a semi-autonomous federal government no-go zone. The Ethiopian economy is facing considerable strain, with citizens reportedly struggling to meet basic needs. The Ethiopian Birr to US dollar exchange rate has weakened substantially, going from 53 to 1 to 170 to 1. Overall, observers have drawn comparisons between Ethiopia’s current circumstances and Argentina in the 1930s. Comparatively, some suggest that Eritrea and Djibouti, though smaller in size, may presently experience relatively more stability in the Horn of Africa. Despite this, Dr. Dagnachew has maintained the position that Ethiopia is the most stable country in the region and that Western powers believe Ethiopia can safeguard the Red Sea. It is also important to note that Ethiopia is a landlocked country and does not have direct access to the sea.

 

Lie No. 2: Eritrea does not have Public Institutions.

 

Dr. Dagnachew acknowledged that his statement that “Eritrea does not have Public Institutions” was based on information from Ethiopian National Security Adviser Redwan Hussien, whose appointment as Ethiopian Ambassador to Eritrea was not accepted by Eritrea. This suggests that Dr. Dagnachew’s views may be shaped by perspectives within the Ethiopian government. Those interested in the political history of the Horn of Africa may find that Eritrea has a historical record of establishing public institutions dating back to before its 1991 liberation from Ethiopian control. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) reportedly developed departments in education, social welfare, economics, and health, among others. The EPLF’s underground hospitals provided health services and even produced medicines. Programs such as foot health doctors and the production of basic supplies were also established. The EPLF’s education efforts extended beyond combatants and civilians to include prisoners of war. These structures are said to form the foundation of modern Eritrean public institutions. Comparatively, present-day Ethiopia’s education system faces significant challenges, with millions of students out of school in the Amhara region and low academic achievement in matriculation exams. Similar difficulties are reported in other sectors. In the current information environment, it is increasingly difficult to sustain narratives that are easily contradicted by accessible data.

 

Lie 3. The Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia is Between Ethiopians and Anti Ethiopians.

 

Lie number 3 shows the Dangerous nature of Dr. Dagnachew’s Misinformation Campaign. Tigray is a de facto Northern Region of Ethiopia; currently, the Federal Government has no reach at all. In the past three years with the making of the Ethiopian Federal government, there was a political split in the TPLF, which is a governing party in the region. The split is a pure struggle for power. It has nothing to do with pro or anti-Ethiopian groupings. Yet without any shame, Dr. Dagnachew wanted to divide the region based on loyalty to Ethiopia. In fact, he went on to say further and mentioned the subregions in Tigray that are pro-Ethiopian. The Current Ethiopian Prosperity Party government is known for dividing Ethiopians along ethnic and ideological lines and igniting conflict among them. Dr. Dagnachew’s propaganda falls within such Ethiopian government’s messaging.

 

Lie 4. He is a defender of the Amhara Ethnic group.

 

Dr. Dagnachew states that he is part of a group advocating for the Walkaite, Tselemt, and Tsegede regions to remain under the Amhara regional government. The Amhara region currently faces significant challenges, including reports of violence against civilians, widespread displacement, and disruptions to education. Despite these issues, Dr. Dagnachew has not publicly addressed the human rights concerns affecting the Amhara population. This raises questions about the consistency of his advocacy and the motivations behind his public statements.

 

Conclusion

 

Dr. Dagnachew Assefa is a former academician known for his critical stance towards the TPLF. His outspoken nature and strong opinions have made him a prominent figure in the region’s political discourse. However, concerns arise when considering the broader implications of his views and the potential influence they have. In an environment where the line between opinion and fact can become blurred, it is crucial to evaluate the messages being conveyed critically.

 

Victory to the Masses and Eternal Glory to Our Martyrs.

Rescaling Africa: Beyond Mercator

By
Filmon Yemane
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Introduction

On August 19, 2025, the African Union officially endorsed the initiative Correct The Map, promoted by the organizations Africa No Filter and Speak Up Africa. This campaign, which proposes replacing the traditional Mercator projection with the Equal Earth projection introduced in 2018, aims to restore Africa’s true geographical and symbolic dimensions. Far from being a mere technical matter, this decision represents a political and cultural act of broad significance: to redraw the world map is to rethink power relations, to challenge epistemic hierarchies, and to affirm Africa’s role in shaping global narratives.

Cartographic Distortion as a Colonial Legacy

The representation of geographic space has never been a neutral act; rather, it reflects political, cultural, and cognitive choices with long-term consequences. The Mercator projection, introduced in 1599 by the Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator to facilitate maritime navigation, is emblematic of this dynamic. While it provided a useful technical tool for plotting straight-line sea routes, it also generated distortions that helped consolidate a hierarchical vision of the world. On Mercator maps, Africa appears much smaller than it truly is, while Europe and North America are magnified. This visual imbalance reinforced the colonial imagination of a “center” and a “periphery,” legitimizing centuries of domination by portraying Europe as large, central, and technologically advanced, while Africa was diminished both in scale and in symbolic value.

Equal Earth and the Challenge of Epistemic Justice

The initiative led by Africa No Filter and Speak Up Africa through the adoption of the Equal Earth projection belongs to a broader debate on epistemic justice and the decolonization of knowledge. Equal Earth, introduced in 2018 by Bojan Šavrič, Tom Patterson, and Bernhard Jenny, was designed to represent continents in more faithful proportions, thereby highlighting the true vastness of Africa, the second largest continent on the planet—over fourteen times the size of Greenland and nearly twice the size of Europe. This is not merely a technical correction, but an act of symbolic reparation: by showing Africa as it really is, the projection challenges centuries of cartographic marginalization. The debate around Equal Earth resonates with broader intellectual currents that seek to democratize knowledge, dismantle Eurocentric biases, and build new epistemologies in which the Global South is no longer portrayed as a minor appendix of world history but as a central agent of its future.

Maps, Power, and Africa’s Future on the Global Stage

The African Union’s decision is best understood within a broader context in which the continent seeks to redefine its role in the global order, demanding greater voice in international forums ranging from climate negotiations to reforms of economic institutions. Cartography thus becomes a tool of symbolic diplomacy: correcting maps is a way to contest the centuries-old perception of Africa as “too small” and to reaffirm its centrality. It is significant that institutions such as the World Bank and NASA have already adopted alternative projections, acknowledging the political implications of how the world is drawn. For Africa, embracing Equal Earth signals not only a cultural repositioning but also an assertion of agency: to redraw the map is to redraw the terms of participation in global governance. Far from being a matter of aesthetics or pedagogy, this choice speaks to the core of Africa’s long struggle for recognition, representation, and justice in the international system.

References

Harley, J. B. The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Makura, Moky. “Correct the Map: Africa and the Fight for Representation.” Africa No Filter Reports, 2025.

Monmonier, Mark. Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Ndiaye, Fara, and Selma Malika Haddadi. “Cartography and African Identity: Beyond Mercator.” Journal of African Geopolitics 12, no. 2 (2025): 45–68.

Snyder, John P. Flattening the Earth: Two Thousand Years of Map Projections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions titled "Rescaling Africa: Beyond Mercator", are those of Filmon Yemane and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Setit Media. ኣብዚ "Rescaling Africa: Beyond Mercator", ዘርእስቱ ጽሑፍ ተገሊጹ ዘሎ ርእይቶን ሓሳብን ናይ Filmon Yemane እምበር መትከላትን መርገጽን ሰቲት ሚዲያ ዘንጸባርቕ ኣይኮነን።

Why Ann Garrison’s Perspective on Eritrea Misses the Mark

By
Daniel Mulugeta
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I came across an article on my feed by Ann Garrison titled “Eritrea: We Won’t Kneel Down” on the Black Agenda Report, a news site that publishes commentary and analysis from the Black left. Although I have my reservations about leftism, I completely respect the opinions and views of other people, as everyone is entitled to them. That, however, does not mean those views are protected from criticism especially Ann’s. When I read her article, I could not help but write a counter-piece addressing the gaps and inaccuracies in her analysis, which I find shallow and lacking in understanding of the complex Eritrean political landscape, both in the country and in the diaspora. This article aims to provide a more nuanced view of political realities in the Eritrean diaspora as well as our internal governance.

To preface, not all Eritreans who attend Eritrean festivals are supporters of the government. For many, these events are social gatherings to reconnect with friends, family, and long-time acquaintances. It is true that these festivals are often dominated by pro-government Eritreans, including members of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). National conferences hosted by the Young People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (YPFDJ) are frequently held during these events, and high-ranking PFDJ officials use them to brief the diaspora on the country’s political situation and agenda. This influence makes the festival appear pro-government, which means it is not always a welcoming space for Eritreans who have faced government persecution or hold critical views of the regime.

While some attendees avoid PFDJ-related events and focus solely on spending time with loved ones—like I did at the Dallas 2022 festival others see the festival as a government-sponsored affair, especially those with strong grievances against the current leadership.

The author appears dismissive of Eritreans with valid political grievances, reducing their concerns to a single “complaint” that “Eritrea does not practice electoral democracy.” Here is the excerpt in its entirety:

“There is, of course, a diaspora that hates the current Eritrean government and its president, Isaias Afwerki, with considerable support from American and European ideologues. They forever complain that Eritrea does not practice electoral democracy, a Western form that global elites use to subvert popular movements in Africa, just as they do here in the US. Never mind that Western governments have arranged the assassination of truly popular elected leaders like Congo’s Patrice Lumumba and Togo’s Sylvanus Olympio.”

Ann, if you are reading this, you must differentiate between legitimate calls for political reform within Eritrea and external interference in the country’s affairs. The PFDJ charter of 1994, created by Eritreans for Eritreans, outlined a framework for a multi-party system that would allow nationalist Eritreans to gradually participate in politics. Likewise, the 1997 Eritrean constitution was a homegrown legal framework, not imposed by Western powers. Despite these efforts, both documents have been left to gather dust.

Since 2002, Eritrea’s parliament (Hagerawi Baito) has not convened, and the PFDJ congress has not met since 1994. The ministerial cabinet has been inactive since 2018. Those within the government who have publicly criticized the lack of progress in implementing the charter or challenged the President have faced dire consequences. Many have been forced into exile; others have been abducted from their homes in the early hours of the morning—such as the G-15 or snatched in broad daylight, like the late Minister Berhane Abrehe, who was seized while walking with his youngest son in Asmara in 2018. Families of political prisoners often do not know whether their loved ones are alive or dead. Berhane Abrehe’s family was a rare exception, yet they were only allowed to see him in prison when he was on his deathbed. These are the incidents that divide the Eritrean people, and Ann has failed to grasp the gravity of the situation.

Eritreans are increasingly frustrated by the lack of meaningful progress under Isaias Afwerki’s leadership. While infrastructure projects like dams and agricultural revitalization in certain regions have been completed, they hardly represent the broader institutional development Eritrea needs. Too often, these achievements are used as excuses for the absence of political and institutional reform.

True progress for a developing nation like Eritrea means building a robust banking and financial system, a functioning judiciary, and effective checks and balances across all branches of government—none of which have been achieved under Isaias Afwerki. Instead, the country remains under the grip of one individual, allowing disastrous policies to pass without scrutiny or accountability.

Even playing devil’s advocate—if Eritrea’s leadership never intended to become a democracy and remains a one-party state—it still falls short as a socialist nation. Compare Eritrea with other one-party states like China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos. These countries have functioning bureaucracies, stable governance structures, and institutional mechanisms to ensure leadership continuity. They regularly refresh their leadership to avoid stagnation. Eritrea lacks such mechanisms.

Key positions remain vacant. The Ministry of Energy and Mines has been without a head since General Sebhat Efrem was incapacitated after a 2019 assassination attempt. The PFDJ Secretary position has been empty since Alamin Mohammed Seid’s passing in 2021. The Minister of Local Government—equivalent to a Vice President—has been vacant for months since the death of Minister Weldenkiel Abraha earlier this year. In other one-party states, such vacancies are quickly filled. In Eritrea, they linger, leaving a hollowed-out government.

Ann writes, “At this point in time and in Africa, a government should be judged on whether it serves the interests of its people and has their support, not whether it holds elections.” On this, she is correct—democracy in an uneducated society can produce poorly informed choices, a concern even Socrates voiced. But this should not excuse the Eritrean government’s failure to truly serve its people.

There are two broad groups of Eritreans: those who support the government, seeing it as a protector of national sovereignty, and those who oppose it due to human rights abuses and lack of due process. The reality is that the government selectively serves its people, leaving many disenfranchised and voiceless. Arresting citizens without due process, orphaning the children of detained politicians (such as Mahmoud Sherrifo’s son, Ibrahim, and the children of the G-15), and ignoring legitimate grievances are unacceptable, regardless of political stance. Moving forward will require cooperation between moderate pro-government Eritreans and moderate critics in shaping a post-Isaias Eritrea.

Before concluding, I must stress: this is not, in any way, a defense of Brigade N’Hamedu. I strongly condemn their actions. Violence only deepens divisions in the Eritrean diaspora. However, Brigade N’Hamedu is a symptom of the government’s failure to achieve national reconciliation. When critics are dismissed with labels like “Tigrayan,” “TPLF supporter,” or “Eritrean hater,” the hurt and anger only grow. While their actions are inexcusable, they reflect frustration born from years of being ignored.

Eritreans should have the right to attend whatever festival or organization they choose—it is a fundamental right, and interfering with it is counterproductive. I hope our festivals become more inclusive and less politically charged. But this will require national healing and reconciliation.

To Ms. Ann Garrison: I urge you to step out of your comfort zone and broaden your understanding of Eritrean issues. Read materials that challenge your views. Speak with Eritreans who do not support the government. Understand their grievances and why they hold them. After reading your article thoroughly, I do not believe you truly grasp the plight of our people.

To the other readers: I hope this article sheds light on the complexities of Eritrean diaspora politics and the internal issues that continue to shape our community.

Thank You

Washington and Asmara: A History of an Unresolved Relationship

By
Filmon Yemane
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The relationship between the United States and Eritrea was born in the context of the post-war order shaped by growing bipolar rivalry. From the early years of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy displayed a clear preference for Ethiopia, seen as a strategic partner for controlling the Red Sea and countering African communism. Eritrea’s fate was thus subordinated to geopolitical logic, despite the recommendations of the 1950 United Nations Commission of Inquiry and the clear popular will for independence. A telling remark came from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin makes it necessary that the country be linked with our ally Ethiopia.” This statement not only marked the beginning of an unequal relationship but also set the recurring pattern of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa: the primacy of realpolitik over legitimacy. Washington supported the 1952 federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which was soon hollowed out and then unilaterally annulled in 1962 by Emperor Haile Selassie, without any significant American objection. Eritrea was erased from the international political map while Washington remained silent, consecrating its alliance with Addis Ababa as an absolute priority. Throughout the entire independence war (1961–1991), during which the EPLF led one of the longest African insurgencies, the United States maintained a distant stance, remaining aligned with Ethiopia even after the monarchy’s fall and the rise of the Derg regime.

After Independence

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Derg in 1991 ushered in a new phase. The United States quickly recognized the transitional Eritrean government led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and welcomed the outcome of the 1993 referendum, in which more than 90 percent of the population voted for independence. However, this initial opening did not translate into a structured or lasting relationship. The early years of independence were marked by selective technical cooperation, never consolidated into a stable political partnership. Eritrea’s vision of a self-sufficient state—based on non-alignment and deep mistrust of external interference—clashed with the U.S. approach centered on democracy promotion and aid conditionality. Eritrean leadership rejected from the outset any form of subordination to Western aid policies, viewing them as a source of dependency and instability. The model pursued in Asmara emphasized centralized power, military consolidation, and institutional control. This trajectory further hardened after the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 over the disputed town of Badme. Although the United States initially attempted mediation, it gradually aligned itself with Ethiopia—particularly after Addis Ababa refused to implement the 2002 ruling by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which had awarded Badme to Eritrea. Washington’s failure to enforce the Algiers Agreement deepened the Eritrean leadership’s perception of American double standards: invoking the rule of law when convenient but practicing strategic silence when allies were at stake.

Sanctions and Isolation

In the 2000s, relations between the two countries deteriorated further. A turning point came in 2005 with the expulsion of USAID from Eritrea—an act seen by Washington as authoritarian and by Asmara as self-defense against foreign interference. From that moment on, American diplomatic language became more openly accusatory, alleging that Eritrea had provided military support to the Somali group al-Shabaab—allegations never proven, yet used as the basis for UN Security Council sanctions in 2009, with active U.S. backing. Eritrea responded by reinforcing internal closure: it effectively prolonged a state of emergency without end, abandoned any return to institutional normalcy, and maintained open-ended compulsory military service. In this context, every diplomatic overture was neutralized by reciprocal rhetoric: Washington accused, and Asmara defended. As Richard Reid wrote, “The United States helped make Eritrea a pariah, but the Eritrean government has proved equally adept at nurturing its marginality as a form of national pride.” The distance between the two capitals thus became institutionalized, with the U.S. embassy in Asmara operating at a minimal level, lacking a fully accredited ambassador, while Eritrea remained excluded from all major U.S. multilateral cooperation programs in Africa.

Conditional Prospects

With Donald Trump’s second term beginning in 2024, new possibilities for détente appear to be emerging. The Trumpian approach—less ideological and more transactional—could pave the way for a diplomacy less moralistic and more focused on stability. Already during his first term, the 2018 lifting of UN sanctions and the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia had hinted at the opening of a new cycle. However, this dialogue was interrupted with the arrival of the Biden administration, which brought U.S. policy back to a traditionally hostile stance: strong criticisms of the Eritrean government, condemnations for its involvement in the Tigray conflict, and new restrictive measures against high-ranking officials. As recently as 2023, the U.S. State Department described Eritrea as a “repressive state” and denounced “the total absence of civil liberties.” The new phase inaugurated in 2024 may represent an opportunity to revisit the Eritrean dossier with a less dogmatic lens, but it remains, for now, an unwritten and undefined possibility. The balance of eighty years of relations reveals a never-stabilized relationship, marked by cyclical removals and a constant subordination of Eritrea to other regional or global U.S. priorities. The fact that Asmara has never been treated as an autonomous actor—but always as a variable dependent on Ethiopia or other strategic concerns—largely explains the failure to build a lasting diplomatic channel. A genuine rethinking of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa should include Eritrea not merely as a problem to be managed but as a political and historical subject with its own internal logic.

Bibliography
Reid, Richard. Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Tronvoll, Kjetil. The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and Political Development, 1991–2009. Oslo: Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, 2009.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952, Africa Volume.
U.S. Department of State. 2023 Human Rights Report on Eritrea. Washington, DC, 2024.

XIMDO: A Vanguard for Lasting Peace

By
Abel Kebedom
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0

When the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) defeated the brutal Ethiopian military regime in 1991 and assumed power in Asmara and Addis Ababa, the people of the region hoped for peace in the Horn of Africa. However, those hopes were soon dashed. Although there were some differences between the former allies, tensions were exacerbated in the border areas. The TPLF’s unilateral redrawing of the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary, with support from the German Development Agency (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, or GTZ), and subsequent issuance of a new map was a significant factor in the devastating border conflict that ensued. The reasons behind TPLF’s dangerous decision remain unclear even today. Nevertheless, we can explore some possibilities by examining the history of the conflict.

Internal Conflicts Among TPLF Leaders

The primary players in the Eritrea-Ethiopia 1998–2000 border conflict were a faction currently known as the Tsadkan Group, which included Tsadkan Teklehaimanot, Gebru Asrat, Tsegay Berhe, Siye Abraha, and others. This group believed that Eritrea was an obstacle to their ambitions of displacing the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s faction. Led by Gebru Asrat in Tigray, the TPLF faction worked tirelessly to create a rift between itself and the EPLF to undermine the latter. As a result, the 1998–2000 border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia had both economic and political dimensions, but these were largely orchestrated by certain individuals. Even today, these same individuals are collaborating with the Prosperity Party to dismantle the TPLF and, consequently, XIMDO. They believe that if XIMDO succeeds, their own aspirations for power in Tigray will be thwarted.

Periphery Conflict to Strengthen the Center

Throughout Ethiopian history, those in power have viewed the north as a threat to their rule. Modern Ethiopian leaders, including Menelik, Haile Selassie, the Derg, the TPLF (which led the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, or EPRDF), and the current Prosperity Party, have all engaged in conflicts in Northern Ethiopia. A common strategy used to conduct the war is the divide-and-rule policy. If we focus solely on the current Prosperity Party, we can see its tendency to divide people based on ethnicity, geography, and political ideology, inciting conflict among them. In Ethiopia, conflict has become a mechanism to strengthen the hold on power. The current widespread propaganda pushed by the Prosperity Party against the people of Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea should be viewed in light of this overarching objective.

Western Pressure to Cut Relations with Eritrea

One of Ethiopia’s main issues is its dependency on foreign aid. Western powers are uncomfortable with Eritrea’s independent political and self-reliant stance and seek to limit its influence over Ethiopia. After assuming power in Ethiopia in 1991, TPLF leaders quickly aligned with the Western world. For the West to provide aid to Ethiopia, the TPLF-led government was required to diminish its relationships with Eritrea. A similar situation arose with the Prosperity Party, which, after promising to improve relations with Eritrea, faced pressure from Western powers to sever those ties.

Main Takeaways

The observations above indicate that the border conflict between Eritrea and Tigray (Ethiopia) is largely manmade—created to gain, strengthen, or maintain power in Ethiopia. Following the Pretoria Agreement, the Prosperity Party intended to attack Eritrea with Tigray’s support. When this plan failed, they vacated the Ethio-Eritrea border, prompting conflict between Tigray and Eritrea over the border issue. However, XIMDO emerged, and we now see results contrary to the Prosperity Party’s initial expectations. As anticipated, the Tsadkan Group, in collaboration with the Prosperity Party, is actively working to dismantle XIMDO. The opposition to XIMDO emanating from Prosperity activities in Southern Tigray exemplifies this strategy. Why would peace in the areas bordering Tigray and Eritrea be perceived as a threat to people in Southern Tigray? The answer leads us back to the original motivations behind the border conflict: the desire to gain, strengthen, or maintain power. Both the Tsadkan Group, eager to usurp power from the TPLF in Tigray, and the Prosperity Party, which seeks to solidify its control in the center, oppose the fostering of people-to-people relationships along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border.

Is XIMDO an Alliance for War?

Before addressing this question, it’s important to understand who is currently advocating war in the Horn of Africa. Since the Tigray Civil War ended with a peace agreement, Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party has been provoking its neighbors and ignoring calls for restraint. Government-funded social media activists and state-run television stations continuously broadcast messages of aggression against Eritrea and the ruling party in Tigray. There is no evidence to suggest that Tigray and Eritrea plan to wage war against the Prosperity Party. If conflict arises, it would likely be defensive in nature. So, how is XIMDO positioned as an alliance for war? Naturally, we do not expect those opposed to XIMDO to portray it differently.

Benefits of XIMDO

XIMDO serves as a vanguard for lasting peace along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. It is a mechanism for preventing war, healing wounds, building mutual respect, and fostering trust while respecting territorial integrity. XIMDO aims to ensure that borders do not serve as walls of separation. The northern part of Ethiopia (Tigray) and Eritrea have endured numerous intermittent conflicts, leading to hunger, property destruction, and a decline in population. XIMDO seeks to combat these issues and restore normalcy to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. The truth is that the people of Eritrea and Tigray possess the strength to resist any warlike ambitions of those in power and their advocates. This is why XIMDO represents a strategy for enduring peace.

XIMDO Must Continue

It is true that the Prosperity Party and its allies in Tigray—such as remnants of the Tsadkan Group and the so-called Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals (GSTS)—will fiercely oppose XIMDO. If they succeed, the current peaceful atmosphere along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border will deteriorate. Hopeful developments at the border will cease. It is in the interest of all peace-loving individuals to support XIMDO. This initiative goes beyond a few engagements; it has the potential to transform the image of the Horn of Africa forever. At a time when Tigray is experiencing significant economic and political challenges, it is crucial for Tigrayan scholars to envision a future without the looming threat of war and destruction.

Conclusion

XIMDO is a grassroots initiative for lasting peace that, despite facing numerous challenges, must continue to operate in a thoughtful and organized manner. Given the Pretoria Agreement connecting Tigray with the Federal Government, formal involvement from political parties in Tigray may be challenging. Therefore, community leaders, church leaders, and civic organizations from both sides of the border should take on the responsibility of promoting peace and sustaining the initiative. XIMDO should never be a pawn in political negotiations with any party; it must belong to the people and serve their interests. Western powers seeking peace along the Eritrea–Tigray (Ethiopia) border should support XIMDO. Opposing XIMDO threatens peace and risks bringing the region back into cycles of war and destruction.

Awet N’Hafash and eternal glory to our martyrs.

No Reform, Just Rhetoric: Why Change Won’t Happen Under Isaias

By
Daniel Mulugeta
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0

Isaias’s latest interview has disappointed many Eritreans, and he has come under sharp criticism by several Eritrean media personalities on the internet, as well as a direct rebuttal by his former colleague, Ambassador Andeberhan Woldegiorgis, in an article on Eri-Platform. Some have made a spectacle of the interview, claiming that the President demonstrates his knowledge and prowess in all his appearances, while others have rebuked it as endless halewlew. The tough pill we need to swallow is that the latter is correct. If anything, the interview shows that the much-needed reforms Eritreans have been anticipating will not come for as long as Isaias remains President of Eritrea.

One could argue that the sanctions imposed on Eritrea, coupled with the active efforts of Western imperialism, have contributed to the government’s “martial law” posture—especially since 2001–2002—as well as the economic hardships the country has faced. While the border war gave Eritrea every right to defend itself and safeguard its national security by any means necessary, it should not have served as an excuse, after the war ended, to delay the implementation of the constitution, to neglect revitalizing the economy as promised in the 1994 PFDJ National Charter—which would have enabled Eritreans to invest in their own country—or, worst of all, to indefinitely detain and disappear political prisoners without arraignment or due process.

I would argue that President Isaias exploited the aftermath of the border war to consolidate his power even further by disappearing the top PFDJ leaders (G-15) who were urging him to convene a parliamentary meeting and implement the constitution. I use the word disappearing because I find it difficult to use the word incarcerate when their whereabouts remain unknown. Isaias would go on to disappear other prominent Eritrean government officials who possessed immense knowledge that could have been passed down to the next generation—or forced them into exile—such as the late martyr and tegadalay Berhane Abrehe, Ambassador Andeberhan who now resides in Brussels, Belgium, and Ghebreselassie Yoseph who is in the United States, among many others. Many of Isaias’s former comrades, either in interviews or in their memoirs (i.e., Berhane Abrehe, Andeberhan W/Giorgis), have elaborated on how difficult he was to work with. Ever since the G-15 were arrested, it has all been downhill. I personally believe Eritreans were a quarter-century too late to realize the slippery slope we are on.

There was a tweet made by the media attaché of the Eritrean Embassy in the UK, Yared Tesfay, in which he quoted a remark Isaias made in his interview. It caught my attention, and I had some strong things to say about it:

“President Isaias emphasized the need for strong institutions in Africa, urging nations to take ownership of their development for sustainable growth and empowerment.” — Yared Tesfay

I replied with the following quote tweet to Yared’s post:

“To preach about strong institutions when you have weakened the ministries, dissolved the parliament, and eroded the banking and financial sector of Eritrea is top-tier hypocrisy and gaslighting. Hopefully, Eritrea will have a better leader when this guy bites the dust.”

A few hours after I made the quote tweet, the post went nuclear in the Eritrean political space on X, with many pro-government Eritreans putting me on blast in the comments section and emphasizing how Isaias has been protecting Eritrea from neocolonialism and imperialism. On the advice of a friend—whose name I will not mention out of privacy and respect—I deleted the quote tweet to avoid causing any further backlash. I have reason to believe the post was misunderstood. However, I mostly still stand by what I wrote.

The quote tweet should not be misinterpreted as an open call for the death of Isaias Afwerki. Such a claim would suggest I advocated for his assassination—something I have never done, nor do I support, as I believe it would further destabilize Eritrea. My point was to highlight the reality that Isaias is unlikely to voluntarily step down from the presidency or even attempt to reform the government and economy while still in office. Given the current trajectory and his lack of political will to change the status quo, it appears he will remain in power until he is either incapacitated due to health reasons or passes away from natural causes.

In that event, I hope a reform-minded Eritrean leader will emerge from within the PFDJ ranks—much like China’s transition after Mao Zedong. Despite the hardships under Mao, China entered a new era of reform in both economy and governance under Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor. Eritrea deserves a similar shift toward progress and responsible governance.

It is also worth noting that Isaias Afwerki is now 79 years old. As Ambassador Andeberhan Woldegiorgis aptly observed, he is well into his twilight years and long past his political prime. Sooner or later, nature will take its course. When that time arrives, Eritrea will face two critical questions: First, will there be a peaceful and orderly transition of power? And second, will his successor uphold the same policies that have delayed the nation’s progress—or will they break from the past, implement long-overdue reforms, and steer Eritrea toward sustainable development and accountable governance?

The Interview
The interview itself was split into two parts: one focused on regional issues, the other nominally on domestic concerns. I cannot stress the word nominally enough—because starting off an interview that is supposed to focus on domestic issues with commentary on events in other nations is baffling. Isaias immediately segues into Part II (domestic) with commentary on Sudan’s civil war, Omar Al-Bashir, and Osama bin Laden—hardly relevant to Eritrea’s internal matters and better described as halewlew (i.e., meaningless banter). If the purpose was to address domestic matters, the conversation should have remained focused on Eritrean issues inside Eritrea’s borders.

Many of the topics Isaias touched on—such as food and water security, energy security, transportation infrastructure, and investment—are issues we’ve heard time and time again. Granted, these are valid concerns for a developing country, but they fall more appropriately under the portfolios of the respective ministers rather than the President himself. For example, matters of food and water security would be better addressed in an interview with Minister Tesfai Ghebreselassie, while the state of Eritrea’s transportation system should be discussed with Minister Tesfaselassie Berhane.

There was a time—particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s—when Eritrean ministers gave interviews and discussed their work openly, rather than the President doing it for them. Don’t take my word for it—watch interviews by Berhane Abrehe, Haile Woldensae, or Saleh Meki (credit to Aida Kidane for preserving these interviews on her YouTube channel).

However, due to the President’s persistent micromanagement of ministerial affairs—as detailed by the late Berhane Abrehe in his book—it is nearly impossible to imagine these officials appearing independently on state television to give transparent updates on their ministries’ progress. In other words, it has become a one-man show.

What the President should have discussed is how to revitalize Eritrea in all aspects—politically, economically, and socially. He spoke of the diaspora’s potential to invest in the homeland, but said nothing about revitalizing the banking and financial sector or reforming the economy to make such investment possible. This comes across as all talk and no action. Much of what Isaias discusses—especially given Eritrea’s current state—is trivial for a head of state to be addressing. These are matters that should be delegated to relevant ministers, not handled by the President.

To truly revitalize Eritrea on the political, economic, and social fronts, the discussion of reform is inevitable. Eritrea cannot continue on this trajectory with a government that has a severely weak judiciary, a non-existent parliament, and a crippled financial system. For Eritrea to grow politically, reform must come—but it will not come from Isaias. It will, hopefully, come from someone who ascends to power once Isaias departs this earthly world.

I noticed many people online were upset that Isaias failed to address the growing concern—even among pro-government Eritreans—about the need for sweeping political and economic reform. Many genuinely expected something new or bold from his interview. But those who have followed his interviews over the past two decades didn’t miss anything. The cycle continues because Isaias not only lacks the political will to implement the reforms Eritrea desperately needs—he has shown no interest in doing so.

Until then, listening to Isaias’s interviews is two hours wasted—time that could be spent doing something meaningful or intellectually stimulating, rather than mind-numbing. I would even argue that watching reactions to his interview is equally mind-numbing.

We will meet again when something dramatic happens.
Til then…

Awet N Hafash
Victory to the Martyrs!

Between Fukuyama and Huntington: The Return of the Crusades The Defeat of Liberal Optimism

By
Filmon Yemane
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0

In the post–Cold War intellectual landscape, two grand theories emerged as competing visions of the global future: Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic notion of the “end of history” and Samuel P. Huntington’s darker thesis of a looming “clash of civilizations.” More than thirty years after their seminal texts—The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)—it is increasingly clear that Huntington’s framework has prevailed, not necessarily because it is more accurate, but because it resonates more deeply with the prevailing climate of fear, distrust, and geopolitical rivalry. As global tensions mount—especially in the current escalation between Israel and Iran—Huntington’s framework has reasserted itself as a dominant interpretive lens. It is as though the West, unable to come to terms with its relative decline, has embraced a worldview grounded in perpetual civilizational conflict as a way of simplifying and rationalizing complexity.

In his 1992 book, Fukuyama famously declared the end of ideological history. Drawing on Hegelian dialectics and liberal political philosophy, he argued that liberal democracy—alongside market capitalism and individual rights—constituted the final form of human government. History, in this sense, had reached its philosophical culmination. As Fukuyama wrote: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” This provocative vision had a powerful appeal: it evoked a world finally moving beyond ideological conflict, one in which freedom and prosperity might spread through consensus rather than conquest.

But history did not oblige. The conflicts of the 1990s—from the Balkan wars to the failures of humanitarian interventions—revealed deep structural fragilities. Markets did not necessarily bring democracy; Western intervention often generated instability; and liberalism, far from being universally embraced, frequently encountered resistance, both ideological and cultural. Fukuyama’s teleology came under increasing strain. In this context, Huntington’s thesis began to take root. In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argued that the central conflicts of the post–Cold War era would not be primarily ideological or economic, but civilizational. Civilizations—defined as large cultural entities grounded in religion, language, and historical memory—would become the main actors and antagonists of global politics. “The fault lines between civilizations,” he wrote, “will be the battle lines of the future.” His claim that “Islam has bloody borders” was widely criticized but undeniably influential.

The Civilizational Frame and the Israel–Iran Crisis

Today, the confrontation between Israel and Iran starkly illustrates how Huntington’s civilizational paradigm has been absorbed into Western strategic thinking and media discourse. The conflict is no longer framed in terms of regional rivalry or state interests, but in moral and cultural binaries. Israel is portrayed as the outpost of modernity, reason, and Western values; Iran, in contrast, is cast as a bastion of irrationality and ideological extremism. Diplomatic language gives way to metaphysical moralism. The narrative no longer centers on deterrence or negotiation, but on good versus evil, civilization versus barbarism. This binary rhetoric evokes all the symbolic traits of a crusade: a salvific mission, an existential threat, and the duty to protect the “free world.” The term “crusade” may not be explicitly used, but its logic pervades Western discourse. Such framing delegitimizes complexity and compels a simplistic moral choice: one must either stand with order and progress or with chaos and regression.

This rhetoric has real political consequences. By framing conflicts in civilizational terms, it becomes easier to justify military interventions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. The Iran–Israel rivalry is stripped of its historical and geopolitical intricacies and reduced to a moral imperative. Huntington’s model provides a moral vocabulary that simplifies the world into familiar binaries. In doing so, it delegitimizes alternative readings of international relations and erodes the space for negotiation or compromise.

Why Huntington’s Model Prevailed

Huntington’s framework has triumphed not because of its analytical depth, but because it offers a convenient cognitive shortcut in a time of ideological disorientation. In contrast, Fukuyama’s liberal optimism demanded faith in dialogue, reform, and gradual convergence. His belief in soft power and normative attraction underestimated the persistence of resentment, inequality, and wounded identities. The West’s liberal model, once seen as aspirational, began to be viewed as hegemonic and coercive. Humanitarian wars in Iraq and Libya, democracy promotion in Afghanistan, and regime-change rhetoric in Syria revealed a pattern of intervention that was often destabilizing. In response, Western powers increasingly abandoned the language of pluralism in favor of strategic moralism. Rather than adjusting to a multipolar and culturally diverse world, the West doubled down on its exceptionalism, rebranding power politics as civilizational defense.

The current rhetorical deployment of “values,” “freedom,” and “rights” often serves less to protect those principles universally than to delineate geopolitical allegiances. Non-alignment or dissent is recast as backwardness or hostility to progress. Sanctions, embargoes, and selective isolation are justified in the name of moral clarity. Iran is only the most recent target in a long sequence of adversaries framed not as rational actors but as ontological threats: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and now Russia all occupy this space of exception. Huntington’s victory is thus symbolic and discursive: he provides a moral universe where the world is neatly divided between friends and enemies, civilization and its adversaries. This moral simplification facilitates policy choices that would otherwise require democratic accountability or international consensus.

Toward a Reaffirmation of Peaceful Politics

Yet a world governed by crusades—secular or otherwise—is one destined for perpetual instability. Crusades do not produce order but hysteria; they do not foster peace but polarization. Above all, they foreclose the possibility of shared political construction. If diplomacy becomes unthinkable and compromise is equated with betrayal, then war becomes the default language of politics. The task of critical thought today is to resist this tendency—to recover complexity, to accept the plurality of worldviews, and to reconstruct the legitimacy of peaceful engagement. History has not ended, nor will it. But it can take more just and inclusive paths—if, and only if, we resist the fatalistic allure of the clash. The question is not whether Fukuyama or Huntington was right, but whether we have the courage to imagine alternatives beyond both. This does not require utopianism, but political imagination and intellectual honesty: the ability to hold firm to the idea that peace is not an illusion, but a difficult, fragile, and yet possible construction.

Bibliography
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018.
Snyder, Timothy. The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979

The Cartographic and Media Wars Fueling Eritrea–Ethiopia Tensions

By
Simon Stefanos
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0

In 1997, Germany’s development agency, GTZ, provided technical support to Ethiopia’s Tigray regional administration for the production of a map that placed the town of Badme—recognized under colonial treaties as Eritrean—within Tigray. Eritrea, which had minimal involvement with GTZ, relied on colonial-era and United Nations-recognized maps to assert its sovereignty.

That GTZ-backed Ethiopian map, quietly distributed through state channels and foreign missions, played a pivotal role in escalating tensions. Ethiopia later used the map to justify its position during the 1998–2000 border war with Eritrea, while Eritrea presented treaty boundaries and internationally recognized maps to the United Nations. Ethiopia, despite asserting administrative control, never publicly presented legal cartographic evidence.

By 2025, Germany’s international broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) was again amplifying unilateral claims. In a July article, DW accused Eritrea of training Ethiopian militias and deploying troops into Ethiopia—without providing satellite imagery, UN findings, or verifiable sources. The article recycled allegations from Ethiopia government, its media and advocacy groups but failed to include Eritrea’s responses or any third-party corroboration.

Even more striking was DW’s omission of what is arguably the central driver of current tensions: irredentist claims to a Red Sea outlet made by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and echoed by Ethiopian state medias. These declarations, widely condemned as provocative and destabilizing, were neither mentioned nor critically examined by DW. Similarly overlooked was Ethiopia’s violation of the 2018 agreement, which prohibits both states from harboring or supporting anti-government elements against one another.

Ethiopia has permitted an armed Eritrean opposition group known as Brigade Nhamedu—later officially renamed the Eritrean Blue Revolution Front—to operate openly with an office in Addis Ababa. Reports indicate that the group conducts military training in Ethiopia’s Afar region. More recently, the group formally retained a lobbying firm in Washington, D.C.—a calculated move that signals the internationalization of a campaign to undermine Eritrea’s government, now gaining foreign institutional traction.¹ The timing of this development, alongside Western media’s growing reliance on unverified claims from Tigrayan-aligned activists and think tanks, suggests a coordinated and escalating effort to shape international opinion against Eritrea.

This narrative and political pressure campaign has been further reinforced by foreign actors, including United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), which has published maps that reflect the Tigray Regional Government’s territorial claims. These maps incorporate internationally recognized Eritrean territories into Tigray without reference to the legally binding decisions of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The endorsement of such cartographic representations by UN-affiliated agencies constitutes not only a breach of neutrality but also a dangerous legitimization of contested claims, stoking bilateral tensions between the two countries. In contrast, no credible evidence has been presented to suggest that Eritrea supports any Ethiopian opposition forces. These asymmetries are routinely overlooked by outlets such as DW.

Compounding the situation is the absence of reconciliation between Eritrea and the TPLF-led Tigray administration. Despite the Pretoria Agreement halting formal hostilities, no substantive political resolution or normalization has occurred between Asmara and Mekelle. At the heart of this unresolved tension lies a deeper issue: the persistent refusal by the TPLF-led regional government—and its allied diaspora-based scholars and intelligentsia—to acknowledge Eritrea’s sovereign territorial claims, which are grounded in colonial-era treaties and upheld by the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC).

Tigray’s leadership and intellectual circles have consistently denied or undermined the legitimacy of Eritrea’s internationally recognized borders. To this day, there has been no formal acknowledgment by Tigrayan actors of the human and material costs Eritrea has incurred as a result of Tigray’s territorial ambitions and the unlawful occupation of Eritrean land. This absence of accountability continues to impede the prospect of durable peace.

Simultaneously, TPLF-affiliated scholars and diaspora influencers—often hosted by Western academic institutions and NGOs—have mounted an aggressive media campaign. With support from transatlantic organizations, these actors have amplified Tigrayan-origin narratives accusing Eritrean defense forces of misconduct during both the 2000–2021 war and the more recent Tigray conflict. These claims, frequently repackaged as independent Western research, are rarely subjected to critical scrutiny or balanced with Eritrean perspectives. The number of Eritreans who have perished while attempting to reach Europe and the United States has often been highlighted by international media when convenient to depict a grim picture of Eritrea, yet largely ignored when such coverage would implicate Western or Ethiopian complicity in the migration crisis and the associated deaths and suffering.

This narrative architecture has been further reinforced by advocacy reports such as Power and Plunder, a 2025 publication by The Sentry, which alleges that Eritrea’s leadership has exploited national resources for elite enrichment.² While presented as investigative journalism, the report exhibits selective sourcing, omits relevant historical context, and aligns with broader foreign policy agendas aimed at delegitimizing Eritrea’s post-liberation governance model. Such reports gain disproportionate influence in policy and media circles, often without undergoing rigorous peer review or independent verification.

GTZ’s cartographic intervention helped lay the groundwork for war once. Today, DW’s unverified allegations and strategic omissions, combined with growing foreign patronage of Eritrean opposition groups, UN-linked cartographic distortions such as UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)³, and NGO-driven publications, risk contributing to renewed tensions through media and political pressure. Eritrea’s historical claims remain rooted in documents, treaties, and binding legal decisions issued by recognized boundary commissions. Media narratives—like cartographic representations—must be grounded in verifiable evidence, not repetition.

 

Let history not be redrawn with with cheap media campaign  where once it was delineated with pens.

References

¹ Opposition group Brigade Nhamedu hires lobbyist in the US, Africa Intelligence, July 15, 2025, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/07/15/opposition-group-brigade-nhamedu-hires-lobbyist-in-the-us,110478467-bre.

² Power and Plunder: How Eritrea’s Elites Exploit the Country’s Resources, The Sentry, June 2025, https://thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/PowerPlunderEritrea-TheSentry-June2025.pdf.

³ UNOCHA: Ethiopia – National Access Map

https://www.unocha.org/results?q=Ethiopia+-+National+Access+Map#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=Ethiopia%20-%20National%20Access%20Map&gsc.page=1

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