An Accession That Was a Political Project
In the statement released on 12 December by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through which Eritrea formally notified the IGAD Secretariat of its decision to withdraw from the organization, a long political trajectory is deliberately recalled. Eritrea points to the pivotal role it played in the revitalization of IGAD in 1993, at a moment when the organization was envisioned as more than a diplomatic forum: it was meant to become a political space capable of anchoring peace, security, and regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea’s accession at the time was not merely a formal act, but a substantive political investment in a regional vision that sought to overcome both internal fragmentation and excessive external mediation. It is precisely this historical premise that gives today’s decision its weight. To withdraw from an institution one helped to build is not simply to sever an administrative tie; it is to acknowledge the exhaustion of a political wager that once pointed toward a different regional future.
When an Institution Loses Its Center
The communiqué uses unusually blunt language in stating that IGAD has “forfeited its legal mandate and authority.” This charge is not directed at a single episode, but at a long-term institutional drift that, in Eritrea’s view, has transformed IGAD from a vehicle of regional cooperation into a selective political instrument, shaped by shifting power balances and deployed against specific member states. Eritrea recalls that this perception already led to the suspension of its membership in 2007, following what it described as unwarranted and damaging actions. The critique itself is not without merit, yet it raises a more uncomfortable question. If IGAD has indeed lost its normative core and functional purpose, how did it become impossible, over the course of three decades, to mobilize collective pressure from within to correct its trajectory? Withdrawal may be coherent as an act of protest, but it also signals a deeper resignation: the abandonment of the idea that regional institutions, however distorted, can still be contested, reformed, and reclaimed through sustained political engagement.
The Rhetoric of Cooperation and the Vacuum It Leaves Behind
There is a visible tension between this decision and the broader narrative that has long accompanied Eritrea’s foreign policy. Senior officials consistently emphasize the value of regional and international organizations as instruments of dialogue, peace, and shared development. Yet the 12 December statement concludes that IGAD offers no discernible strategic benefit and fails to contribute meaningfully to regional stability. Even if one accepts this assessment, its implications are difficult to ignore. Eritrea’s bilateral relations with countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia may indeed be constructive, but bilateral diplomacy cannot replace a structured regional framework. Without a common institutional platform, cooperation remains exposed to political volatility, sudden crises, and leadership changes. Walking away from a regional organization—even a deeply flawed one—means accepting a fragmented regional order in which coordination gives way to ad hoc arrangements and fragile understandings.
Isolation as an Outcome, Not a Strategy
Ultimately, Eritrea’s withdrawal from IGAD appears coherent in its diagnosis but fragile in its forward-looking vision. The Ministry’s statement offers a compelling account of past grievances, yet remains largely silent on what replaces the abandoned institutional space. Exiting a regional organization is almost always a historical defeat, even when framed as an assertion of political dignity. Isolation is rarely a strategy; more often, it is the cumulative result of unresolved conflicts and exhausted channels. If IGAD is ineffective, politicized, or structurally distorted, the more ambitious response would have been to remain and force its contradictions into the open, turning institutional conflict into a catalyst for reform. Leaving instead cedes the field to precisely the dynamics being criticized and reinforces the notion that regional multilateralism is inherently irredeemable. This is perhaps the deepest cost of the decision: not the withdrawal itself, but the renunciation of a political struggle that, however arduous, remained the only credible alternative to the solitude of choice.
