The relationship between the United States and Eritrea was born in the context of the post-war order shaped by growing bipolar rivalry. From the early years of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy displayed a clear preference for Ethiopia, seen as a strategic partner for controlling the Red Sea and countering African communism. Eritrea’s fate was thus subordinated to geopolitical logic, despite the recommendations of the 1950 United Nations Commission of Inquiry and the clear popular will for independence. A telling remark came from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin makes it necessary that the country be linked with our ally Ethiopia.” This statement not only marked the beginning of an unequal relationship but also set the recurring pattern of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa: the primacy of realpolitik over legitimacy. Washington supported the 1952 federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which was soon hollowed out and then unilaterally annulled in 1962 by Emperor Haile Selassie, without any significant American objection. Eritrea was erased from the international political map while Washington remained silent, consecrating its alliance with Addis Ababa as an absolute priority. Throughout the entire independence war (1961–1991), during which the EPLF led one of the longest African insurgencies, the United States maintained a distant stance, remaining aligned with Ethiopia even after the monarchy’s fall and the rise of the Derg regime.
After Independence
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Derg in 1991 ushered in a new phase. The United States quickly recognized the transitional Eritrean government led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and welcomed the outcome of the 1993 referendum, in which more than 90 percent of the population voted for independence. However, this initial opening did not translate into a structured or lasting relationship. The early years of independence were marked by selective technical cooperation, never consolidated into a stable political partnership. Eritrea’s vision of a self-sufficient state—based on non-alignment and deep mistrust of external interference—clashed with the U.S. approach centered on democracy promotion and aid conditionality. Eritrean leadership rejected from the outset any form of subordination to Western aid policies, viewing them as a source of dependency and instability. The model pursued in Asmara emphasized centralized power, military consolidation, and institutional control. This trajectory further hardened after the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 over the disputed town of Badme. Although the United States initially attempted mediation, it gradually aligned itself with Ethiopia—particularly after Addis Ababa refused to implement the 2002 ruling by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which had awarded Badme to Eritrea. Washington’s failure to enforce the Algiers Agreement deepened the Eritrean leadership’s perception of American double standards: invoking the rule of law when convenient but practicing strategic silence when allies were at stake.
Sanctions and Isolation
In the 2000s, relations between the two countries deteriorated further. A turning point came in 2005 with the expulsion of USAID from Eritrea—an act seen by Washington as authoritarian and by Asmara as self-defense against foreign interference. From that moment on, American diplomatic language became more openly accusatory, alleging that Eritrea had provided military support to the Somali group al-Shabaab—allegations never proven, yet used as the basis for UN Security Council sanctions in 2009, with active U.S. backing. Eritrea responded by reinforcing internal closure: it effectively prolonged a state of emergency without end, abandoned any return to institutional normalcy, and maintained open-ended compulsory military service. In this context, every diplomatic overture was neutralized by reciprocal rhetoric: Washington accused, and Asmara defended. As Richard Reid wrote, “The United States helped make Eritrea a pariah, but the Eritrean government has proved equally adept at nurturing its marginality as a form of national pride.” The distance between the two capitals thus became institutionalized, with the U.S. embassy in Asmara operating at a minimal level, lacking a fully accredited ambassador, while Eritrea remained excluded from all major U.S. multilateral cooperation programs in Africa.
Conditional Prospects
With Donald Trump’s second term beginning in 2024, new possibilities for détente appear to be emerging. The Trumpian approach—less ideological and more transactional—could pave the way for a diplomacy less moralistic and more focused on stability. Already during his first term, the 2018 lifting of UN sanctions and the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia had hinted at the opening of a new cycle. However, this dialogue was interrupted with the arrival of the Biden administration, which brought U.S. policy back to a traditionally hostile stance: strong criticisms of the Eritrean government, condemnations for its involvement in the Tigray conflict, and new restrictive measures against high-ranking officials. As recently as 2023, the U.S. State Department described Eritrea as a “repressive state” and denounced “the total absence of civil liberties.” The new phase inaugurated in 2024 may represent an opportunity to revisit the Eritrean dossier with a less dogmatic lens, but it remains, for now, an unwritten and undefined possibility. The balance of eighty years of relations reveals a never-stabilized relationship, marked by cyclical removals and a constant subordination of Eritrea to other regional or global U.S. priorities. The fact that Asmara has never been treated as an autonomous actor—but always as a variable dependent on Ethiopia or other strategic concerns—largely explains the failure to build a lasting diplomatic channel. A genuine rethinking of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa should include Eritrea not merely as a problem to be managed but as a political and historical subject with its own internal logic.
Bibliography
Reid, Richard. Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Tronvoll, Kjetil. The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and Political Development, 1991–2009. Oslo: Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, 2009.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952, Africa Volume.
U.S. Department of State. 2023 Human Rights Report on Eritrea. Washington, DC, 2024.
