In my article titled, “Root Causes of the Current Power Struggle in Tigray, Ethiopia,” published September 23rd, 2024, on Setit.org, I outlined four scenarios focused on how the power struggle between the Tsadkan group and The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray was likely to be resolved. Scenario one was described as follows:
“The Debretsion group may attempt to remove the Getachew and Tsadkan group from power and replace them with core TPLF officials. Such a scenario is plausible only if the army agrees to support the Debretsion group. Since the federal government cannot afford another conflict with the TPLF, it may accept the TPLF’s actions and continue business as usual.”
Six months have passed and unlike previous fatal mistakes, this time, the TPLF played its cards smartly. Given the multiple wings and networks of the Tsadkan power grab group, any hasty decision by the TPLF to topple the group might have resulted in some limited conflict. When he mounted the power grab strategy in Tigray, Tsadkan had the backing of the Federal Government, diplomats from some big Western countries, the Prosperity Party-affiliated Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals (GSTS), and of course, the grudge holders like Gebru Asrat, Siye Abraha, and Abebe Teklehaimanot. The major weakness of the Tsadkan group was its rejection by the military. Its move to gain support by exploiting old regional fault lines in Tigray — especially Gebru Asrat calling the Tigray Military Leaders “Protectors of the Adwa Dynasty” — was the hallmark of the group’s use of regionalism as a playing card. Painting the TPLF as an Eritrean Government messenger seriously backfired. When Debretsion explained that it was Getachew Reda who was meeting with the Eritrean Government, Getachew’s credibility hit rock bottom.
The strength of any political leadership is measured by its ability to analyze the regional and international political landscape and relate it to its domestic strengths and weaknesses. Using its domestic strengths, it exploits opportunities and fends off threats and weaknesses. The TPLF’s strong base in Tigrayan society and its relationship with the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) are its strengths. The TPLF’s grave mistake was its failure to analyze the consequences of the wrong decisions it had been making in the last twenty-seven years. Especially not accepting the Ethio-Eritrea boundary decision and swiftly moving onto its implementation was the most fatal mistake of all. Abiy Ahmed smartly exploited this TPLF mistake and used it to weaken the TPLF and assert power in Ethiopia. Now it seems the TPLF has learned from its mistakes, and it is closing similar loopholes that could expose it to other risks. Also, the TPLF exploited Abiy Ahmed’s unwarranted threat to its neighbors and his attack on his former allies in the Amhara region. These two missteps significantly weakened Abiy Ahmed’s government, and the TPLF used them wisely.
Another big lesson for the TPLF is the danger of “Grudge Holders.” The brazen move by the Tsadkan group and its readiness to throw Tigray into sub-regional conflict is very scary, to say the least. The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s decision to expel the grudge holders, including Tsadkan, from the Army and the TPLF was right, and the TPLF should have seen the dangers of bringing Tsadkan to power. Not surprisingly, using the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, Tsadkan was ready for revenge and erasing the TPLF from Tigray’s political landscape at any cost.
The victim in the power struggle was the figurehead Getachew Reda. Tsadkan used the regionalism card and exploited his greed for power and lavish lifestyle to trap Getachew in his power-grab camp. Then, using the cover of Getachew, Tsadkan started calling the shots. Eventually, those shots led to the demise of the whole group, but Getachew lost more than Tsadkan. He was loved and respected by the Army and the TPLF echelons of power. Eritrea was very receptive to Getachew’s move to improve relations. Eventually, Tsadkan, through his networks, blocked Getachew’s move to reconcile relations with Eritrea. Hopefully, Getachew will reconcile with his old TPLF colleagues and will get a chance to lead a peaceful civilian life in Tigray. His political career in Tigray is over for good, but his presence in Tigray will facilitate reconciliation. It seems the TPLF’s decision not to move forward with arresting Getachew considered such an opportunity.
The coming of Tadesse Worede as president of the Tigray Interim Administration has been long overdue. He is trusted by the TPLF and hails from the Enderta region. The Enderta region has grievances about being marginalized from power. Remember, the grudge holders’ group used that card to discredit the TPLF, mainly in the Southern Region of Tigray. Now that such grievance is alleviated — at least for now — and the TPLF controls the administrative structure in Tigray, what are its possible future objectives?
- TPLF’s Priority: The TPLF’s priority is to get its party reinstated. Abiy Ahmed’s government used the TPLF’s old strategy to dismantle the TPLF from within. By bringing the Tsadkan group into power and placing Getachew Reda as the figurehead, it worked hard to split and eventually weaken the TPLF. Although Abiy’s strategy has weakened the TPLF significantly, eventually it failed miserably and the TPLF is in control now. As described in Scenario One, the Abiy government has been weakening politically and economically. It does not have the means or willingness to initiate any conflict with Tigray. Accordingly, the Abiy government has no choice other than reinstating the TPLF as a party and returning its blocked money in a bank and investments in Ethiopia. The TPLF’s reinstatement as a political party will help it participate in the upcoming Ethiopian election and can facilitate its integration into the Ethiopian Federal System.
- Return of Displaced People: The return of displaced people has been a thorny issue between the TPLF and the Abiy government. The TPLF wants the displaced people to return with the administration that existed before the start of the war. The TPLF’s request is another way of saying “handover Wolkait and Tselemti to us.” The Federal government wants the displaced people to return accompanied by militia who were residents of the two regions before the war. Unless they find a middle ground, this issue will continue to drag on and eventually become an obstacle to any full reconciliation between the Abiy Ahmed government and the TPLF.
Conclusion
Tadesse Worede being at the helm of power in Tigray guarantees the TPLF’s dominance in the Tigray regional administration structure. Unlike the Tsadkan group, the TPLF does not have any problem with putting all its administrative structure under Tadesse Worede. The TPLF will help Tadesse Worede lead Tigray’s Interim government to conduct its activities effectively and eventually transfer power to the TPLF, possibly during the upcoming election. Due to its missteps, the Abiy government will continue to get weakened. Before it is incapacitated like Getachew Reda, the TPLF can extract more benefits from the Abiy government. In the end, Ethiopia’s future lies in the TPLF, Fano, and OLA combined transitional government. Till then, the TPLF’s neutral position in regional politics is the way to go. Any missteps by the TPLF will put them in a very dangerous position. Let regional politics play itself out.
Awet N’Hafash and Eternal Glory to Our Martyrs.
