We are living in a transformative era in which the long-standing global order is giving way to a more complex structure defined by the emergence of multiple regional powers. The notion that the world had reached “the end of history,” as famously argued by Francis Fukuyama, has proven to be not only premature but fundamentally flawed. History has not ended; it has evolved. Societies, driven by diverse identities, aspirations, and power dynamics, continue to reshape global political landscapes. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn of Africa—a region marked by centuries of conflict, colonial legacies, and rich civilizational narratives.
Among the most consequential developments in this region is the slow but visible unraveling of Ethiopia’s national unity. After the fall of the Derg regime, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced a federal system based on ethnicity, aiming to empower Ethiopia’s diverse national groups—most notably the Amhara, Tigray (Tegaru), and Oromo. While this structure was intended to foster inclusion and autonomy, it inadvertently planted the seeds for future disintegration. By organizing the state as a federation of ethnically defined regions, the EPRDF set the stage for the rise of subnational identities that often viewed themselves as distinct political entities. Over time, these regions increasingly operated as states-in-waiting, not as components of a unified Ethiopian polity.
From Eritrea’s perspective, this ethnic federalism has always been a cause for concern. Eritrea’s identity is built upon a civic nationalism that transcends ethnic divisions—a unity forged through a protracted war for independence and solidified by a commitment to shared citizenship. The prospect of Ethiopia fragmenting into ethnic micro-states threatens this cohesion by reigniting historical rivalries and encouraging cross-border ethnic allegiances. Ethiopia’s disintegration would not remain a domestic issue; its effects would spill over into neighboring states, particularly Eritrea.
One of the most pressing dimensions of this threat is the growing demand for Tigrayan nationhood. In recent years, some Tegaru elites have increasingly called for full sovereignty. While their grievances—rooted in political marginalization and recent armed conflict—may be legitimate, the consequences of such a move extend far beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Eritreans must examine this issue critically, not out of hostility, but because of the profound implications it carries for Eritrea’s own stability.
Tigray has several elements that support a claim to nationhood: a common language, a cohesive cultural identity, and historical significance within the Ethiopian empire. However, there is a critical shortcoming in this national vision—the implicit dependence on the Tigrinya-speaking population of Eritrea. Many Tigrayan nationalists view the Tigrinya cultural and linguistic connection across the border as a potential unifying force for a broader Tigrinya nation. This is where the danger lies.
Eritrean Tigrinyas, despite cultural affinities with the Tegaru, have never defined themselves ethnically. Their national consciousness is firmly Eritrean, shaped by shared sacrifice, an inclusive identity, and decades of resistance against foreign domination. Eritrean Tigrinyas did not fight for an ethnic homeland—they fought for an Eritrean nation composed of many ethnicities and religions, united by citizenship and mutual respect. The idea that they would now abandon that national identity to join an ethnic union with Tigray is deeply flawed and dangerous.
This miscalculation by some Tigrayan elites reflects a misunderstanding of Eritrean society. Eritrean nationalism deliberately avoids the ethnicization of politics. Suggesting that one segment of the population would betray that consensus not only ignores the social fabric of Eritrea but also threatens to provoke division among its various ethnic groups. If the Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans are seen—even mistakenly—as aligning with Tigray, it could cause unrest among other Eritrean communities such as the Tigre, Afar, Saho, Bilen, and others, who might fear marginalization in a redefined national context.
Moreover, the danger is not limited to the Tigrinya question. Should other Ethiopian ethnic groups—like the Afar—pursue independence, they may also lay claim to their ethnic kin inside Eritrea. This would escalate tensions further and risk dragging Eritrea into ethnic disputes that it has spent decades working to avoid. Eritrea’s current national framework, rooted in civic rather than ethnic identity, would come under immense pressure.
Ethiopia’s disintegration could mark the beginning of a new and dangerous chapter in the Horn of Africa—one characterized by border disputes, contested identities, and endless political reconfigurations. For Eritrea, this could mean decades of macro-level crisis management, social destabilization, and even renewed conflict. What’s at stake is not just territorial integrity but the ideological foundation of the Eritrean state itself.
This is why Eritrea must approach the current situation with strategic clarity. It must not treat Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation as a distant issue or a manageable technical matter. It is a geopolitical emergency with direct consequences for Eritrea’s future. Eritrea must adopt a firm but balanced stance—supporting Ethiopia’s territorial unity while resolutely defending its own national cohesion.
Under no circumstances should Eritrea encourage or give credibility to secessionist movements in Ethiopia, particularly those that implicitly or explicitly seek to incorporate parts of Eritrea’s population. Doing so would not only compromise Eritrea’s sovereignty but also provide a dangerous precedent for ethnic irredentism in the region. Eritrea knows, more than any other country in the Horn, what it takes to become a nation. It must not allow that hard-earned wisdom to be undermined by speculative dreams of ethnic solidarity across borders.
Eritrea’s strategy should be twofold: diplomatically, it should act as a stabilizing force in the region, promoting dialogue and unity in Ethiopia while reinforcing international respect for its own borders. Internally, Eritrea must invest in strengthening its national institutions, promoting inclusive development, and reinforcing a unified national identity that resists ethnic division. The state should reaffirm that citizenship, not ethnicity, defines what it means to be Eritrean.
Eritrea has unfinished business at home—economic revitalization, political reform, and the empowerment of its youth. The last thing it needs is to be swept into a regional crisis that threatens to undo its revolutionary vision. The unraveling of Ethiopia, if allowed to continue unchecked, could become a regional earthquake. Eritrea must ensure that it is not standing at the epicenter when it hits.
In conclusion, the aspirations of Tigray or other ethnic regions for nationhood must be examined not only through the lens of justice and self-determination but also through the lens of regional security and mutual respect. Eritrea must be proactive, vigilant, and principled in its response—defending its identity, its sovereignty, and its vision of a united, inclusive, and stable nation in the midst of growing regional uncertainty.
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