The recent surge of visits by notable figures of the Eritrean dissents and opposition in diaspora (ex-opposition) to Asmara have confounded pro-government and opposition circles. This development has ignited intense debate on social media regarding its motives and implications and whether it marks pragmatic steps toward much-needed reforms or a cautiously calculated maneuver to solidify authoritarian rule.
Much of the debate stems from the Eritrean Government’s established approach to dissent at home and abroad. Inherited from its army struggle days, when absolute obedience and high centralization of power were a sine quo non for the victory of the struggle, the government has zero tolerance for dissent. Thus, in post-independence Eritrea, dissent lacked political space to sprout.
The Diaspora Dilemma: A Strategy of Non-Recognition
Silenced at home, different forms of dissent have flourished in the diaspora. The government applied a strategy reminiscent of Khartoum’s “Three Nos (No Recognition, No Negotiation, and No Peace)” resolution of Arab countries against Israel in 1967. To date, the government has neither publicly acknowledged it has opposition nor shown willingness to negotiate or reconcile with the various opposition groups.
Against this backdrop, the wave of visits raises a fundamental question: why has the government allowed the visit of its adversaries to Asmara now? The government’s policy regarding the opposition figures remains intact; hence, its primary motivation appears to be a calculated effort to dominate the public relations narrative. YouTube channels affiliated with the government extensively covered the visits, often portraying returning figures as disillusioned defectors who validate the ruling party’s long-standing narrative. In some instances, visitors also toured villages, engaging with local communities in a manner that discredited the opposition’s credibility in the diaspora and burnished the ruling party’s image. Thus, the visits lubricated Asmara’s propaganda machine and offered a massive public relations coup.
Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks?
The short-term government gains could have long-term risks. While capitalizing on the Public relations narrative by inviting members of the opposition (Former members in some cases) to Eritrea, the government is inadvertently giving tacit recognition to the presence of the opposition, which it has long denied. If the visits continue, it could challenge the carefully curated narrative that dissent is virtually nonexistent against the Government of Eritrea and that any opposition is externally manufactured.
Most significantly, this shift could abate Asmara’s most potent ideological tool: the portrayal of dissent as treason. The ideological tool has entrenched the belief that dissent is a sacrilege, which results in permanent exile. Though it is premature to conclude the waning influence of such belief hard-wired in Eritrea’s political culture, the symbolism of these visits suggests an evolving perception—namely, that returning to Eritrea should be a right, not a privilege granted based on political allegiance.
A Fractured Opposition and the Question of Strategy
Paradoxically, the opposition struggles have also contributed to the recent shifts. Since the start of the Tigray devastating war in Northern Ethiopia in 2020, the once-united Eritrean diaspora opposition has been deeply divided along ideological lines. While some staunchly believe that violence is the only way to bring change, others prefer non-violent engagement with the government.
Proponents of the latter approach argue that after more than two decades of protests, lobbying, and violent confrontations in Western cities, the opposition camp failed to yield tangible outcomes as it couldn’t compel the government to open the political and economic space. The status quo prompted many to evaluate the modus operandi of the opposition and shift their strategy towards engaging with the ruling elites while maintaining their goals. Drawing lessons from the state collapse resulting from the Arab Spring and considering Eritrea’s fragility, defenders of this position further argue that peaceful transition and reforms could only occur by engaging with the government, as seen in other countries. Thus, the visits are pragmatic, strategically farsighted, and politically correct.
Regarding peaceful transition, the end of the apartheid regime through a complex and long-negotiated settlement between the ANC and the ruling elites in South Africa is a case in point. The transition avoided bloodshed and state collapse. For this to be viable, several critical conditions must met. First, the opposition has to mount pressure on the government, forcing it to acknowledge that continued repression is unsustainable. Second, reform-minded voices within the government must emerge and be willing to engage with moderates in the opposition; in contrast, hardliners on both camps must be convinced, co-opted, or marginalized. Finally, civil society actors play a crucial role in fostering trust between all parties.
At present, none of these conditions exist in the Eritrea. The opposition, which has lacked leverage over domestic politics, remains unable to exert meaningful pressure on the government. Furthermore, its bargaining power diminished as the visits became more of an individual rather than a collective initiative. As far as leaders are concerned, the reformist voices within Eritrea are under the surface, and time will tell if the trend inspires these voices to sprout or lay a foundation for further collaboration between the two forces.
Empowering hardliners, Undermining Reform?
In the meantime, the new trend has emboldened the hardliners on both ends of the spectrum. Most in the opposition camp rebuked the visits as a betrayal, driven by personal ambition rather than a genuine push for democratic reforms. Equally, for the government’s fervent supporters, the visits are proof of the government’s unassailable position, reinforcing the idea that opposition efforts are futile.
Moreover, critics argue that no matter the good intentions of the visitors, these visits are symbolic and cannot catalyze change. Authoritarian governments inherently resist peaceful and voluntary reforms, and Eritrea is no exception. For the past three decades, the government has been ruling through an iron fist rule, without any political concessions, making it unlikely that a handful of return visits will suddenly alter its trajectory. Instead, these engagements may serve as a tool to neutralize diaspora activism—especially in an era where satellite TV, social media, and offline video-sharing platforms have amplified opposition messaging inside Eritrea.
Personal and Cultural Motivations
Beyond politics, cultural and personal factors may also be driving these visits. For many Eritreans in the diaspora, the concept of homeland carries deep emotional and symbolic significance. The desire to reconnect with one’s birthplace—or, at the very least, to be buried in one’s ancestral land—is deeply embedded in the Eritrean psyche. For some, these visits may represent not a political maneuver but rather a personal pilgrimage, a longing to reestablish ties with their roots.
Conclusion: A Crossroads for Eritrea’s Future
In the unpredictable geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, these visits could entrench authoritarian control or serve as the first steps toward reconciliation and restructuring. The government is less likely to embrace reforms without sustained pressure. And if the visits fail to empower the reformist voices within Eritrea, it risks becoming another tool for political control rather than a step toward democratization.
Ultimately, the road to meaningful change in Eritrea remains fraught with uncertainty. Whether these visits serve as catalysts for transformation or mere symbolic gestures will depend on the broader political context—and whether opposition forces can muster the unity and strategic vision necessary to convert engagement into tangible political progress.
እዚ ናይ ሃኒ ሪኢቶ ኣይጸላእኩዋን ፡
ብዝበለጸ ኣንባብን ተረዲኡ ኽኣ ሓሳቡ ዘቐምጥ ክትረክብ ብትግርኛ እንተ ትጽሓፍ ጽቡቕ ኔሩ።