A Persistent Threat: International Law and Ethiopia’s New Maritime Ambitions

On 9 July 2018, in Asmara, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki signed a historic peace agreement, officially ending a latent conflict that had begun in 1998 and continued for nearly two decades in a state of “no war, no peace.” The treaty finally recognized the legitimacy of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), established by the Algiers Agreement of 2000, which awarded contested areas, including the town of Badme, to Eritrea. For this diplomatic breakthrough, Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. However, that optimism was short-lived. Since 2023, the Ethiopian government has resumed an assertive rhetoric on the issue of access to the sea, raising questions about the durability of peace and respect for international law. The Prime Minister’s statements, in which he declared Ethiopia’s readiness to pursue access to the sea “through peaceful means or, if necessary, by other instruments,” reopen unresolved wounds and pose a serious threat to regional stability.

Access to the Sea and International Law: The Status of Landlocked States

Ethiopia’s geographic position as a landlocked country is a condition shared by 44 other states worldwide. International maritime law, codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in Montego Bay in 1982 and in force since 1994, provides a legal framework for regulating the rights and obligations of coastal and landlocked states. Part X of the Convention (Articles 124–132) specifically addresses the rights of landlocked states, recognizing their right of access to and from the sea through the territories of transit states, based on bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Article 125, paragraph 1, establishes that “landlocked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea and freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport.” However, paragraph 2 clarifies that the exercise of this right “shall be by mutual agreement of the States concerned” and cannot be imposed unilaterally. In other words, international law does not authorize any automatic territorial concessions or access to port infrastructures unless agreed upon by the parties. Demographic size or economic power is not a valid legal criterion for claiming maritime access or sovereign control over another state’s territory.

International Precedents: The Cases of Bolivia and Austria

Two emblematic cases illustrate how access to the sea for landlocked countries is addressed through legal and diplomatic means: Bolivia and Austria. The first concerns the long-standing dispute between Bolivia and Chile, in which Bolivia has claimed sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean since 1904, after losing its coastline in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884). In 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a clear ruling: while acknowledging Bolivia’s legitimate interest in securing a corridor to the sea, it concluded that Chile had no legal obligation to negotiate sovereign access. The ruling reaffirmed that a state’s territorial sovereignty is inviolable unless explicitly relinquished through mutual consent.

The second case is Austria, which became landlocked after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Today, through bilateral agreements with Slovenia, Italy, and Germany, Austria makes use of ports such as Trieste, Koper, and Hamburg for its commercial and industrial needs without claiming sovereignty or extraterritorial rights. These cases demonstrate that international law favors cooperation and negotiated arrangements over unilateral demands or historical justifications.

Ethiopian Claims Between Historical Ambiguity and Demographic Assertiveness

In Ethiopia’s case, claims to a “historic” or “natural” right to sea access are unfounded on multiple levels. Not only do they lack legal merit, but they are also questionable from a historical standpoint. While Ethiopia may have exercised nominal control over certain coastal territories during brief imperial or colonial episodes, it has never developed a substantive maritime tradition or established effective sovereignty over port infrastructures. For centuries, the coastal regions were inhabited and administered by distinct communities, often under Ottoman, Egyptian, or Italian influence, until the formation of modern Eritrea. Eritrea’s independence, formally recognized in 1993 following a popular referendum and international recognition, established a clear and legally binding border: Ethiopia has been a landlocked state both de facto and de jure ever since.

The second justification advanced by the Ethiopian government concerns its growing demographic pressure. With over 120 million inhabitants and projections estimating a population of 150 million by 2050, it is argued that such a large country “cannot remain landlocked.” While rhetorically persuasive, this argument has no basis in international law. The international system is built on the principle of sovereign equality among states (United Nations Charter, Article 2), not on population size or geographic extent. Accepting such logic would legitimize geopolitical hegemony and undermine the very foundations of international law and peaceful coexistence.

Toward a Peace Based on Law and Mutual Respect

The stability of the Horn of Africa cannot be secured through displays of force, strategic allusions, or expansionist ambitions disguised as economic necessity. Ethiopia’s aspirations for greater maritime access are legitimate only insofar as they are pursued within the framework of multilateral agreements, economic partnerships, and customs arrangements that fully respect the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors. It is important to recall that Article 2 of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. Any scenario of unilateral pressure or political coercion against Eritrea would violate this principle and expose Ethiopia to international accountability.

The only sustainable and lawful path to the sea lies in regional cooperation. A politically stable and economically integrated Ethiopia could negotiate beneficial logistical agreements with neighboring countries, including the use of Assab or other regional ports such as Djibouti or Berbera. Any other approach, based on fabricated historical claims or the transformation of demographic dynamics into geopolitical leverage, would only drag the Horn of Africa back into an era of suspicion, instability, and conflict.

It is time to return to the spirit of 2018, to value the opportunities offered by economic integration grounded in respect for borders and sovereignty, and to reject all imperial nostalgia. Peace is never a finished act but a process nourished by justice, legality, and political will. Only on this basis can the region build a future where international law is not the language of abstraction but the foundation of concrete coexistence.

Bibliography

United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, 1982.

International Court of Justice. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Judgment of 1 October 2018.

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco, 1945.

African Union. Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lomé, 2000.

Geneva Academy. The Right of Landlocked States to Access the Sea. Briefing No. 14, 2022.