Many people are surprised to see how fast the political structure in Tigray has been crumbling. Officials of the Tigray Provisional Government, established under the auspices of the Pretoria Agreement, and the core leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) are heading towards what seems like a direct collision. Although it has manifested recently, the current power struggle in Tigray has a long history.
During the 17 years of TPLF’s war against the Ethiopian Government.
During the 17-year (1974-1991) war that the TPLF waged against the then Ethiopian government, there were many complaints about the dominance of the Adwa, Aksum, and Shire (Ashea) group within the upper echelons of the TPLF leadership. Rumors circulated that many TPLF combatants who hailed from areas outside the Ashea sub-region of Tigray, and who dared to challenge the Ashea group’s dominance, were executed. Such grievances persisted even after the TPLF, with the help of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), assumed power in Addis Ababa. Farmers from the Enderta area around Mekelle and from Raya have long complained about the confiscation of their farmland by the Ashea-dominated TPLF leadership with little or no compensation. These grievances were suppressed and waited for the right moment to resurface.
During and after the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea Border War.
The 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea Border War was seen as a good opportunity by TPLF officials from the non-Ashea areas (Raya, Enderta, and Tembien) to challenge the historically dominant Ashea group. The slogan was that after the Badme war, their next action would be to overthrow Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who hailed from Adwa. Members of the revolting group included then Defense Minister Siye Abraha, Tigray regional government president Gebru Asrat, Ethiopian army general Tsadkan Gebretensae, Air Force chief Abebe Teklehaimanot, and others, mainly from Raya, Enderta, and Tembien. However, after the war, Meles outmaneuvered them, imprisoning Siye Abraha and his brother on charges of corruption, and removing others from their positions in the Federal Government and the TPLF. Thus, the first attempt to seize power from the Ashea group failed.
During and after the 2020-2022 Tigray War.
After the TPLF attacked the Northern Command on November 4, 2020, and the Ethiopian army, with the assistance of the Eritrean army, swept through Tigray, some TPLF leaders, such as Getachew Reda and Tsadkan Gebretensae, began to rethink the war. They believed that the war could have been avoided and argued that to prevent it, the TPLF should have joined the newly formed Prosperity Party. Additionally, senior army leaders like Tsadkan were unwilling to be dictated to by the younger TPLF executive leadership. Once again, the non-Ashea group saw the war as an opportunity to wrest power from the Ashea group. They asked TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael to form a new command separate from the TPLF to lead the war, but Debretsion refused. After the TPLF’s defeat in the third round of the war, it had no choice but to sign the Pretoria Surrender Agreement. The agreement, among other things, outlined that Tigray would be ruled by a provisional government. Abiy Ahmed, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, quickly exploited divisions within the TPLF, refusing to accept Debretsion’s nomination and instead handing over leadership of the provisional government to Getachew Reda and Tsadkan Gebretensae, who were seen as more aligned with the federal government. Tsadkan, who harbors ambitions to join the federal government, is especially in sync with the policies of the Prosperity Party. Using Getachew as a cover, Tsadkan took initiatives to reduce the TPLF from a governing party to just another political party in Tigray. Tsadkan also secretly enlisted the support of smaller political parties in Tigray to undermine the TPLF, heralding his hidden democratization initiative. In essence, the Getachew and Tsadkan group aims to smooth Tigray’s reintegration into the federal system and secure higher positions in the Federal Government. Meanwhile, vital issues like achieving food self-sufficiency in Tigray have been pushed to the back burner.
Head Collision between the TPLF and the Provisional Government led by Tsadkan and Getachew.
Under the pretext of democratization, Tsadkan encouraged Getachew to dismantle the TPLF. As a result, Getachew began firing the old guards of the TPLF’s regional administration and replacing them with individuals loyal to him. The TPLF old guard responded by calling for a convention and expelling Getachew and his followers from the TPLF executive and central committees. Currently, the two groups do not recognize each other and are at loggerheads. While the Getachew group accuses the Debretsion group of receiving encouragement from Eritrea, the Debretsion group accuses the Getachew group of being soft on the federal government and squandering Tigray’s national interests. The dangerous part of this division is that each side is playing the regionalism card. The Debretsion group is using its Ashea roots to challenge the Getachew and Tsadkan group, while the non-Ashea areas are supporting the Getachew and Tsadkan group. The support of ex-TPLF officials like Gebru Asrat, Siye Abraha, and Abebe Teklehaimanot for the Provisional Government further illustrates that the current actions against the TPLF are also addressing old grudges.
Potential Future Scenarios:
The Debretsion group may attempt to remove the Getachew and Tsadkan group from power and replace them with core TPLF officials. Such a scenario is plausible only if the army agrees to support the Debretsion group. Since the federal government cannot afford another conflict with the TPLF, it may accept the TPLF’s actions and continue business as usual.
The Getachew and Tsadkan group may attempt to consolidate power by expelling TPLF loyal mayors and regional administrators. While likely, this would aggravate the TPLF and increase the likelihood of direct conflict, especially in the TPLF stronghold of the Ashea area. If the army decided to intervene, it could turn against the Getachew and Tsadkan group.
The army might step in to fill the power vacuum, removing the provisional government and overseeing the administration of Tigray. If the army promises to conduct a general election within a year, restoring power to the TPLF old guard, this scenario could gain popular support.
The Getachew and Tsadkan group might provoke a conflict with Eritrea to prolong their stay in power. The recent heightened rhetoric about Eritrea occupying Tigrayan territory suggests such intentions. However, the people of Tigray likely have no appetite for war, so while the rhetoric may increase, crossing into open conflict seems unlikely.
Conclusion:
If not properly managed, the current power struggle in the Tigray region could have serious implications for the unity and stability of the area. Civil war instigated by the two groups cannot be ruled out. Ultimately, the TPLF is likely to reclaim power from the provisional government. If it can do so without creating divisions within the army, it may be the only way to save Tigray from descending into chaos. The Getachew and Tsadkan group lacks a strong foundation in Tigrayan society and cannot dislodge the well-entrenched TPLF from power. In this power struggle, the Abiy government remains largely on the sidelines, waiting to negotiate with whichever group emerges victorious.
Awet N’Hafash and Eternal Glory to Our Martyrs